| The main goal of the paper is to deal with the incentive constraints mechanism under the united property rights institution, and compares it with the incentive constraints mechanism under the unilateral corporate governance. Our conclusion is that the incentive constraints mechanism under the united property rights institution is better and can produce more cooperative surplus than that under the structure of the unilateral corporate governance, so the author tries to study some important conceptions of structure of corporate governance and the incentive constraints mechanism by putting them under the logical structure of property rights theory. Firstly, the paper expounds the nature of the entrepreneur and points out that the function of the entrepreneur changes after the change of the way the enterprise produce cooperative surplus, and with the development of the knowledge economic, both the function of judgment and the function of creativeness of the entrepreneur become more and more important in the enterprise. Secondly, the paper mainly analyzes the incentive constraints mechanism of the entrepreneur in the capital-controlled enterprise represented by Japan-Germany pattern and UK-US pattern, and then analyzes the logical relationship among the entrepreneur, the property rights and the enterprise. The paper emphatically points out that because of the defect of the property rights of the entrepreneur, the entrepreneur is insufficiently inspirited and restricted. In order to eliminate those defects, the property rights institution should be reformed, that is to say, the united property rights institution should be established and the incentive constraints mechanism of the entrepreneur under the united property rights institution should be used. The mechanism of the incentive constraints of the entrepreneur under the united property rights institution must mainly depend on the inside governance which is supplemented by the outside governance.
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