Economic Research Of Judicial Rent-seeking And Judicial Corruption

It is the gradual improvement of the environment of China's legal system and the rule of law that makes social and economic life of our people much closer to the law. In economic activities caused by disputes and resort to more and more represented in the judicial dispute resolution mechanism. However, in today's China, the judicial rent-seeking and judicial corruption has become a serious social problem. Judicial corruption is not only a serious violation of social equity and justice, people's belief of the judicial authority and credibility; but also to the work of our judicial corruption and judicial reform has posed a serious challenge. Both judicial and academic fields are discussing these relative issues with in-depth research. This article is from the viewpoint of law and economics according to the causes, the hazards and the countermeasures of judicial rent-seeking and judicial corruption.The methods of economics research and analytical tools, which are different from the traditional method of judicial corruption in the academic research paradigm .From the judicial dispute settlement mechanism in the formation of the reasons monopoly, combined with the litigants of the cost - benefit analysis and cost structure of court, using game theory analysis of litigation between the parties and the judge in the rent-seeking activities based rental activities. With the monopoly model, the author tries to explain how the court vendors to develop the high price of rent in order to achieve access to rents. The high price of litigation proceedings and judicial services has become an important reason for high thresholds. Additionally, the author uses the information economics and public choice theory of "government failure" to explain the lawyers'"intermediary"status in the activities of the judicial corruption and the existing judicial system defects are analyzed.In addition, through our current situation and characteristics of judicial corruption investigation and study, I believe that the harm of judicial corruption is: a lack of impartiality of the trial, which distorts the right of the physical arrangement, as well as influences the economic efficiency of market allocation of resources, resulting in both legal and economic double the market inefficient. At the expense of social justice, they also brought serious negative externalities and the expansion of social welfare loss.For proposing the judicial rent-seeking and judicial corruption countermeasures, the author tries to put forward a judicial reform and "Institutional Anti-Corruption" combined to save on transaction costs, minimize the social cost of judicial corruption also with other goals and objectives of the proposed design of the system of judicial corruption corresponding: Guiding and regulating the alternative dispute resolution mechanisms; reform of the judicial management system; construction of efficient judicial oversight mechanisms and so on. Proposing design of the anti- judicial corruption also related the cost - benefit analysis considerations, in order to ensure effective and efficient system design.All in all, this paper aims at using a special law and economics perspective to discover the causes, the hazards and countermeasures of judicial rent-seeking and judicial corruption in a more systematic analysis. I hope to learn from previous theoretical results, based on the economics way of thinking on issues related to judicial corruption, which is different from the traditional interpretation of legal scholars. What is more, via the perspective of economics of law, I could better rethink the relationship between economy and law, as well as justice and efficiency so as to find more economic and efficient ways of prevention and punishment of judicial rent-seeking and judicial corruption, including specific institutional arrangements of some countermeasures. In this way, I sincerely hope to make my humble dedication to solve this problem not only theoretically but also practically.