Study On Prevention Of Operator' Moral Hazard About Xinjiang Production And Construction Group

The study object of this thesis is the operator's moral hazard problem in the state-owned farm of Xinjiang Production and Construction Group (XPCG) .The thesis analyses the operator's moral hazard problem with the economics theories and methods of the theory of principle-agency and the game theory.First, this thesis explains the basic theories about operator's moral hazard including the production and development of moral hazard; the definition in such concepts as moral hazard, information asymmetric, adverse selection, opportunism, etc.; some general theories of moral hazard such as the theory of principle-agency, team production, insider control, etc.Secondly, this thesis analyses the behavior of operator's moral hazard of XPCG farm in detail, according to its motives, we divide it into the profit chasing type and shirking type. On this basis, we analyses the forming reasons of operator's moral hazard and draw the conclusion that we should solve the moral hazard problem from the incentive, the restrictive and the supervise factors.Thirdly, with the game theory, this thesis structures the incentive and restrictive model in behavior-choosing of the farm operator and the influence factor model of the operator's moral hazard. From these models, we can draw the conclusion that the proportion of excess achievement that the operator can share in the farm, salary, the income that can be obtained after being changed, the probability changed, reputation income, etc. will all influence the emergence of operator's moral hazard behavior.Finally, the thesis points out that it is impossible to take precautions against the farm operator's moral hazard completely, no matter what incentive and restrictive mechanism we set up, the moral hazard of the farm operator will exist. Our efforts are to try our best to reduce the probability that the moral hazard takes place and to reduce its injury extent. So, on the basis of theory analysis, the current situation analysis and the model analysis, this thesis probes into the measures of taking effective precautions against operator's moral hazard of XPCG farm.In the conclusion part of the thesis, it points out that to take precautions against the farm operator's moral hazard is a system-engineering, and we must adopt many kinds of the incentive and restrictive ways against it effectively.