An Inquiry Into The Fundamental Appeals Of Pound's Theory Of Interests

Roscoe Pound, one of the most famous western jurists in the first half of the 20th century, devoted all his life to the development of sociological jurisprudence. His theory of interests is not only the essential component of sociological jurisprudence, but also of great importance to the understanding of sociological jurisprudence. What principle is to determine the relative weight of the overlapping or conflicting interests and how those interests are valued are at the very core of Pound's theory of interests, which is greatly determined by the fundamental appeals of Pound's theory of interests. However, concerning the substance and the characteristic of the fundamental appeals of the theory of interests, different writers have offered different opinions, which can be divided into two kinds of approaches, the approach of social interests and the approach of neutral frame. This whole dissertation is based on the inquiry into the turn of fundamental appeals of Pound's theory of interests, attempting to reveal its characteristic which is different from those proposed by the two approaches and to reveal the philosophical view of pragmatism held by Pound. The whole dissertation consists of four chapters, in addition to the introduction and the conclusion.In the first chapter, the two opposite approaches to the fundamental appeals of the theory of interests is discussed. The writers who stick to the approach of social interests hold the view that Pound's theory of interests involves some substantial value. In this way, it is closed to some extent. Those writers regard the purpose of Pound's theory of interests as protecting social justice. In their opinion, the law tends to place an emphasis on social interests when there are overlapping or conflicting interests. On the other hand, the writers who comply with the approach of neutral frame stick to the point that Pound didn't attempt to emphasize any interest or value in his theory of interests. All he provided for us was an objective and neutral frame, into which different interests and values can be put or added. This keeps open Pound's principle of determining the relative weight of the overlapping or conflicting interests. Consequently, in order to make sure what on earth the fundamental appeals of Pound's theory of interests are, it is necessary to trace back to Pound's own works, and to analyze them in the process of the development of Pound's theory of interests.The second chapter concentrates on the turn of the fundamental appeals of Pound's theory of interests. Generally speaking, the fundamental appeal of the theory of interests turns from social interests, social justice and organized human effort to individual interests, individual liberty and free spontaneous initiative. In the early stage of the theory of interests, Pound regarded social interests and social justice as the most important thing the law had to protect, based on the acute criticism of abstract individualism. Concretely, three steps are taken to obtain such a purpose. To begin with, social interests and individual interests are put on the same level through the introducing of the concept of interest. Secondly, historical and realistic arguments are used to justify the emphasis placed on social interests and social justice. Finally, the period of socialization of law is constructed, in which social interests are widely protected. While in the later stage of the theory of interests, Pound insisted on individual interests, individual liberty and free spontaneous initiative in order to resist and protest against the interference of service state, which is backed by humanitarian idea and authoritarian idea.The third chapter mainly discusses the characteristic of the fundamental appeals of Pound's theory of interests, which seems open at first sight, but is closed as a matter of fact. On the one hand, Pound contrived to keep a variety of values in harmony through the neutral frame of civilization instead of reckoning any value as the ultimate end of law, which kept open the fundamental appeals of the theory of interests. On the other hand, Pound set some substantial value as the exclusive end of law of the given time and place, which made the fundamental appeals of the theory of interests closed to a great extent. After discussing the characteristic of the fundamental appeals of Pound's theory of interests, the author comments on the two approaches given above and tries to point out their mistakes of understanding respectively. The writers who comply with the approach of social interests tend to neglect the concrete appeals of the theory of interests of the given time and place. As a result, they are not able to discover the sharp turn of the fundamental appeals in the later stage of Pound's theory of interests. So it is difficult for them to form a dynamic and comprehensive understanding of Pound's theory of interests. What's more, they are so reluctant to admit that the fundamental appeals of Pound's theory of interests are closed to a great extent that they can't see the limitation of Pound's theory of interests brought about by such a characteristic. The writers who comply with the second approach also neglect the sharp turn of the fundamental appeals of the theory of interests. This keeps them in the danger of reducing a complex theme into a unitary one and labeling Pound's theory of interests merely as theory of social interests.In the last chapter, the author analyzes the philosophical view of pragmatism held by Pound which is behind the fundamental appeals of the theory of interests. First of all, the author gives a brief description of pragmatism in terms of the purpose of this dissertation. Secondly, the author points out the characteristic of Pound's pragmatism which is composed of three subjects. And the three subjects are as follows: the truth is not abstract, but the truth of given time and place; the truth of given time and place is determined by its function and effect; the function and effect of the truth of given time and place is determined by the inquiry into the empirical facts. The last but not the least important, in light of the philosophical view of pragmatism held by Pound, the author points out the theoretical advancements and limitations of Pound's theory of interests. As far as the theoretical advancement is concerned, the theory of interests provides a dynamic and concrete perspective for the legal study. It is also capable of uniting a great number of theoretical appeals and theories. Above all, these two advancements help Pound's theory of interests to adapt to the changes of society in the era of social transformation. However, it is very important to take the limitations of Pound's theory of interests into consideration. Subjected to the philosophical view of pragmatism, Pound's theory of interests are not able to look at the relationship between the nature of law and the function of law and the relationship between theory and empirical facts correctly. And this will reduce the theory of interests into some defense of a kind of value which appears to comply with the empirical facts but involves some impartial views as a matter of fact.As Pound's theory of interests is a theory of the era of social transformation, the inquiry into its fundamental appeals is also of great importance to the construction of legal theory and legal practice of China.