On The Corruption Control System In The U.S. Executive Branch

This thesis aims to discuss the corruption control system in the American executive branch and assess the achievements and drawbacks of such a system.The writer identifies several periods in American history when corruption was rampant. The corrupt acts can all be attributed to declined morality environment, inadequate accountability institutions, and lack of transparency in the work of the government.The anti-corruption system theory of Miller, Spence and Roberts is adopted in this thesis to analyze the corruption control system before and after Watergate. While the corruption control system before Watergate was largely a reactive system whereby corruption was dealt with passively through post-event rule-making and punishment, the system after Watergate developed into a comprehensive anti-corruption system with a focus on prevention. Such a preventive system seeks to: (1) promote ethical behavior among public officials by way of ethics laws, code of ethics and ethics training; (2) strengthen corruption investigation and prosecution; and (3) increase government transparency through"sunshine"laws, whistle-blowing mechanism and financial disclosure.The preventive system has, to a certain degree, curbed the spread of corruption, restored public trust and confidence in the government and provided a clearer guideline for official behavior. But meanwhile there are some drawbacks. It increases the federal budget, puts a heavier burden on the officials'time and energy, brings trouble to the President in his nomination of the new government, and delays government service delivery.