A Study Of The Cooperation Conditions In The Peasant Collective Action

Collective action is an important and energy-consuming topic in social science. The cooperation dilemma of collective action embodies in the prisoner's dilemma, tragedy of the commons and Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. The unaccomplished cooperation will have a strong influence on the common interests of players, while cooperation improvement not only lowers the efficiency loss but also increases the players' social capital. However, many cases of the unaccomplished cooperation often could be found. Through these cases about the public goods'voluntary provision in the rural area,the thesis finds the source,process, dilemma and punishment of the peasant cooperation. Based on these cases, the thesis creates a theoretical framework to systematically analyze the cooperation conditions of the China peasants'collective action: sharing costs,screening yield and the amendment of yield function in certain constraints.Then the thesis creates a concise model to explain the cooperation conditions of the theoretical framework.The constraints incorporate into the cost constraints includes the life and product costs represented by lack of cooperation, the transaction costs represented by the collective decision and trust, and the public goods' cost of cooperation provision. The incentives have two variables: sharing costs and screening yield. The peasant of collective action has accumulated the fairness sense of identity. The screening yield depends on a clear definition of the property rights.The amendment of yield function needs to amend the punished cost of noncooperation yield,which depends on the enforcement of punishment mechanism.