Study On Risks Of The New Faculty Recruitment From The View Of The Principle-Agent Theory

With the zooming development of higher education, universities shoulder more responsibility on social and academic. The performance of the responsibilities depends on the exertion of faculty's function. Top-ranking universities and excellent faculty always bring out the best in each other. So it is important to the constant and healthy development of universities that they must recruit high - quality faculty and make full use of them. However, there are still many risks of the faculty recruitment because employers couldn't know the applicants' quality or monitor their behavior generally which caused by the particularity of faculty human capital. Thus, there are many pseuds and some opportunistic behaviors. They will restrict the vocational development and realization of strategy of the university.With the innovation of faculty appointment system in China, faculty become "Social Man" from "Academic Man". In universities, governors depute the realization of education goal to faculty. Faculty undertake the commission and get rewards from universities. They become the principal and agent. However dissymmetrical information, incomplete contracts and conflicting interests in the faculty recruitment cause some risks such as adverse selection and moral hazard. This paper, from the perspective of the principal-agent theory, discuss the principal-agent relationship and risks of faculty recruitment, and puts forward some relevant measures from information delivery system, recruitment system, prevention system and prompting system.This paper is divided into five parts. The first part is an introduction. It summarizes the theory of faculty recruitment in the second part, and elaborates the present situation and the cause of the risks according to the principal - agent theory in the third part, and then it put forwards some measures on evading risks. In the last part, it makes a conclusion.