The Economic Analysis Of Export Credit Insurance Based On Principal-agent Theory

Compared to other kinds of insurance, there is less domestic theoretical study on export credit insurance. This thesis first gives a brief introduction to the relative study of export credit insurance and current situation of the development of export credit insurance in China and other developed countries. Then it sets up a principal-agent model by means of some relevant theory of game theory to analyze the relationship between importers and exporters who insure their goods. Through analysis of the model we can draw a conclusion that as a policy insurance offered by the government, the export credit insurance is helpful to expand the scope of the export, but at the same time the existence of some moral hazard on the side of the exporter who insures the good is introduced. Under the commercial rate and the noncommercial rate the thesis analyzes the model and we can obtain the price scope of trade. Export credit agencies can reduce and prevent moral hazard through making suitable insurance proportion and insurance premium then expanding the scope of export, and at the same time this thesis gives some suggestion for domestic export credit insurance.