Research For The Information Dissymmetry Problem Of The Medicine Market Of China

The medical market in China has gone through a significant change with thedevelopment of medical system, the change of medical model and the improvement ofthe intellectual level, but information asymmetry is still one of the important featuresin medical market. According to info-economics, such problems like "market failure"and accordingly information resources allocation inefficiency, tense relationshipbetween hospitals and patients etc. may appear caused by information asymmetry.This thesis proposes practically meaningful advice pointed to the problems caused byinformation asymmetry in medical market, in order that core competence should bedeveloped and medical market should develop healthily and stably. The thesis takes information asymmetry as the starting point of the study of therelevant problems concerning medical market. Also, the thesis studies the problemsmedical market faces under the circumstances of information asymmetry from thepoint of view of information asymmetry theory, game theory in economics, andrelevant theories in management.Firstly, the thesis has done a lot of material accumulation work on the appearanceand development of information asymmetry;and has studied the current situations ofthe research work on information asymmetry theory as well as the problems ofinformation asymmetry concerning medical market. Secondly, the thesis has aninsight into the problems of information asymmetry in medical market both in Chinaand abroad as well the negative influences caused by it.. The analytic method of gametheory in info-economics is applied to construct a game model between medicinemanufacturers and patients and between hospitals and patients under the currentinformation asymmetry. Compared to game equilibrium under complete information,the thesis illustrates the reasons of the low efficiency of resources allocation inmedical market under information asymmetry. Next, information asymmetry theory ininfo-economics is applied to analyze "adverse selection" model and "moral hazard"model between hospitals and patients, as well as between medicine manufacturers andpatients. On the basis of the analysis mentioned above, the last part of the thesissuggests reducing information asymmetry in medical market and proposes somesolutions to the problem. At the same time, construction of signal processing modelagainst adverse selection, signal screening model, incentive -restrictive model againstmoral hazard, as well as the involvement of government and the perfection ofrelevant laws and regulations are also included in this thesis.