The Game Analysis About Different Rescue Modes Of The Earthquake Disaster

In recent years, the situation of natural disasters in our country is grim and complex, and the disaster risk is more and more serious. Every year hundreds of millions of people were affected by the disaster, and thousands of people lost their lives. According to the report, since 1949, the magnitude of the earthquake occurred in more than 7 levels 11 times, and the direct economic losses caused by the hundreds of billions of dollars.There are many ways to deal with natural disasters at present, which can be divided into two categories. One category is Self-rescure. In the early days of natural disasters, because of its sudden and the block of news, the victims usually rely on their own strength to implement the rescue. The other category is Outside-rescue. As time goes on, the information is spread, and the government, enterprises, social organizations and other organizations join the rescue team.However, if the remote countryside suffers a major natural disaster, they will face the devastating blow. Their existing financial income can not bear the loss of disaster. And the main way to get through the crisis is to accept other people’s donations, that is, Outside-rescue. However, if there is no effective Self-rescure, the role of Outside-rescue will be limited. At the same time, there are many phenomenons of occupating and embezzling the disaster relief materials by the grass-roots government in the rescue process, which seriously affected the effect of Outside-rescue.Therefore, in order to make the disaster rescue more efficient, we must strengthen the coordination and cooperation between Self-rescure and Outside-rescue in the emergency rescue phase firstly, and the second is to strengthen the management of relief supplies in the stage of post recovery. Through the study of the optimal allocation and supervision of disaster relief, it can not only ensure the fair share of relief supplies, but also avoid the breeding of corruption in the grass-roots organizations, and has important guiding significance for the smooth implementation of the earthquake relief work.In this paper, we have studied the Self-rescure and Out si de-rescue and the phenomenon of occupating and embezzling the disaster relief materials by the grass-roots governments. The concrete research work and conclusions include the following two points. Taking into account the collaborative evolution mechanism between the information dissemination and the social organization structure, we have constructed the evolution game model of earthquake life rescue. Then the model is solved by the theory of White Manifold and the Mental Model. In the end, the evolutionary equilibrium of different rescue modes is analyzed with the specific case. The specific contents of this paper are as follows. First, we analyze the process of the earthquake life rescue and study the collaborative evolution mechanism of two important factors that are the information communication and the social organization structure. On this basis, the dynamic game model of enterprise leaders and employees in earthquake life rescue is constructed. Taking into account the different strategies of the enterprise leaderships, we solve the White Manifold evolution solution of the earthquake life rescue model in different rescue modes. Then, taking into account the different participants’ perception, we use the mental model theory to analyze the stability of the dynamic game model. And we use the generalized dynamic equation to solve the model’s evolution solution of Mental Model. Finally, we analyze the case of the two enterprises in Wenchuan earthquake. The Netlogo software is used to simulate, and the evolution path of equilibrium in different rescue modes is studied, and the effects of the different parameters on the equilibrium results are analyzed.We address the issue of occupating and embezzling the disaster relief materials by the grass-roots government, and establish the signal game model between governments and donors to provide a theoretical guidance for the government in emergency rescue. The specific contents of this paper are as follows. First of all, we assume that the main participants in the model, the post disaster relief and the reliability of the governments, and illustrate the two stage of the game between the two parties in the rescue process. Then, we construct the signal game model of post disaster emergency rescue, and set the utility function of the governments and the donors.The innovations of this paper include the following two aspects.(1)Based on the theory of scenario analysis, the thesis makes a research on the rescue and salvation of different earthquake life rescue mode with unique perspective, and constructs a dynamic evolutionary game model based on the mechanism of information dissemination and the social organization. In addition, we use different methods to solve the model, and make a comparative analysis.(2)The problem of occupating and embezzling the disaster relief materials by the grass-roots government is studied, and the transmission mechanism of the signal is analyzed, and the signal game model between the governments and the donors is established. Moreover, we analyze and solve the information in the two stage according to the information is complete or not.