Font Size: a A A

Study On Stock Option Incentive Mechanism Issues Of China's Listed Company

Posted on:2011-02-15Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:D F LiFull Text:PDF
GTID:2189330332466501Subject:Accounting
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
In the modern enterprise system, enterprise has separated proprietary rights and management rights, and it forms the principal-agent relationship. Because of the differences between the owner and the operator's objective functions, they will damage each other's interests when they pursuit their own maximizing interests, which is the principal-agent problem in the modern enterprise. The ultimate goal of the principal-agent theory is to find a reasonable incentive mechanism, which could converge the owner and the operator's interests, and minimize the principal-agent cost. Stock options incentive mechanism is such a reasonable long-term incentive mechanism. It gives operators the claims to obtain residual income distribution, and it contacts the operator's pay and the company's long-term interests, also it converge the owner and the operator's interests. Stock options incentive mechanism originated in American in the 1950s, in the 1980s began to popular in the worldwide, and became a very popular way to encourage the executives of the large listed companies gradually. However, as one of the main reasons, stock options incentive mechanism was in troubles because of Enron Company and WorldCom Company's financial fraud case at the beginning of the 21st century. Meanwhile, since 2006, china had revised《Company Law》and《Securities Law》, and then, promulgated a series of policies to promote the stock options incentive mechanism. In such a background, how to treat stock options incentive mechanism? Will our country still need to promote the incentive mechanism? We need to solve these problems. Reviews the stock options incentive mechanism, and analyze the problems when the listed companies use this mechanism are very necessary.This thesis starts with introducing the basic theory of stock options incentive mechanism, according to the problems when the listed companies use this mechanism, analyze the main reasons, and on the basis of drawing on the foreign successful experience, put forward some improvement strategy. In the research method, mainly use normative research and qualitative research. The process of problems analysis, integrating theory with practice, not only pay attention to absorb and draw upon the overseas research achievements, but also pay attention to analyze the current situation which the listed companies faced when they implement the stock options incentive mechanism. Always with the clue of how to apply the stock option theories and how to solve the problems of the listed companies faced. At the same time, in the process of writing I searched and referred heavily literature, and had accumulated previous research achievements.This thesis is divided into five chapters. In the first place, it gives a general introduction about the research background and significance, the relevant literatures at home and abroad, the research approach and thinking, and the basic framework. Secondly, it is the part on the basic theory, which introduces the concept feature of stock options and the stock options incentive mechanism, and mainly introduces the three important theory of the stock options incentive mechanism:the principal-agent theory, the incentive theory and the human capital theory. Thirdly, it is about proposing the problems and analyzing the reasons. The thesis.analyzes the problems including: restricted by some laws and regulations, stock price cannot reflect the listed company's performance, lack of incentive effect when a operator is appointed, "The insider control" phenomenon, lack of performance evaluation index and operators manipulate information disclosure. According these problems, thesis finds six reasons:laws and regulations are not perfect, the effect of capital market is weak, professional manager market is not mature, the corporate governance structure is not complete, the performance evaluation system is not reasonable and inadequate disclosure of information. Then the next part mainly introduces the foreign successful experience on the stock options incentive mechanism, involving America and Japan's companies which implement the stock options incentive mechanism. The last part gives some improvement recommendations when the listed company implements the stock options incentive mechanism. Including two parts:one is the environment, and the other is listed company. From the angle of the external environment, the main strategies are: improve the stock options incentive mechanism laws and regulations, cultivating effective capital market, establish a professional manager market, and develop intermediary institutions. From the angle of the listed company, the main strategies are: improve corporate governance structure, establish scientific performance evaluation system, improve information disclosure, and use multiplication stimulation.As a new system, stock options incentive mechanism introduced into China in a very short time, and is still in the initial stage. Though this thesis analyzes the mechanism, the implementation of this mechanism still needs further studies, only in this way could the listed company to develop and implement the stock options incentive mechanism.
Keywords/Search Tags:Listed company, Stock options, Incentive mechanism
PDF Full Text Request
Related items