The Third-Part Reverse Logistics Provider Selection And Incentive Mechanism Design Based On EPR

With the rapid development of information industry and the extensive use of electronic equipment, electrical and electronic equipment replacement cycles continue to shorten, resulting in a series of problems such as resources consumption, environmental pollution and increasing the amount of waste materials. At the same time, waste electrical and electronic equipments(WEEE) are valuable renewable resources, thus enhancing the recovery of waste electrical and electronic equipments for the development of circular economy, creating a conservation-oriented society, overcoming the shortage of resources on China's economic development constraints, preventing and reducing environmental pollution and protecting human health are of great significance.The extended product responsibility(EPR) has given great attention to more and more scholars, and put it in practice in many countries of organization for economic cooperation and development(OECD).EPR system shifts the responsibility of waste treatment which has traditionally been shared by the government and taxpayers to production enterprises. Production enterprises take the responsibility to recycle and reuse waste products, and the responsibility of product-related environment.Spicer et al (2004) pointed out that the third-party recovery mode is ideal for recycling waste materials. Once production enterprises identify third-party reverse logistics providers(3PRLP) to perform EPR to recycle WEEE, facing the primary strategic decision-making challenge is how to evaluate and select the appropriate 3PRLP. In the implementation of third-party reverse logistics business, the relationship between production enterprises and 3PRLP is principal-agent, 3PRLP is the agent of information superiority and can make a correct assessment of his actions, however production enterprises are the principal of inferior information, who can't fully understand the real situation of the 3PRLP. Therefore, production enterprises must design an optimal incentive contract, binding 3PRLP to choose the best action to maximize the interests of both sides, and ultimately achieving a win-win objective.This paper absorbs domestic and foreign scholars'theoretical study and managers'practical experience, standing on the perspective of production enterprises, on the one hand, taking the environmental benefits and development potential as important one grade indexes, designs an innovative evaluation index system to evaluate and select 3PRLP based on EPR, taking into account the weight of the panel members, integrates AHP and fuzzy math to build a fuzzy synthesis evaluation(FSE) model. The model reduces the subjective impact, not only gets the final evaluation results, and pointes out the advantages and disadvantages of optional 3PRLP.On the other hand, based on principal-agent theory, building a bilateral principal-agent model between the production enterprises and 3PRLP, the paper analysises the incentive problems under the information symmetry and asymmetry information, as well as the introduction of market competition. Then, faced with many 3PRLPs, establishes a multi-agent model under asymmetry information to the producers to analyze the optimal incentive problems, discussing various factors'impaction on the coefficients of incentive and production earnings.This study could facilitate the research of the EPR, enhance to recycle and reuse WEEE, improve the evaluation index system of 3PRLP under EPR and choose a more rational evaluation method, promote the principal-agent mechanism design between productive enterprises and 3PRLP. In practice, this study could help production enterprises to fulfill EPR to recycle waste materials to choose a suitable 3PRLP and design incentive mechanisms.