Incentive Mechanism Design Based On The Principal-Agent Theory Of Thirdparty Logistics Service Innovation

In the fierce market competition environment in Chinese, it has emerged some new logistics service mode such as logistics finance, real estate, and integrated logistics and so on from third party logistics enterprises. In the theory of service innovation and relevant theoretical research foundation, the logistics service innovative mode, strategy and the way as well as the innovation incentive and supervision mechanism etc. undertook more thorough research. But there still exist some problems, including the third party logistics service innovation alliance dynamic incentive mechanism, the subcontractor’s irrational, customer perception and evaluation of impact on innovation and subcontractors as well as a number of client services on the incentive mechanism of the influence of situation. The papers focus these four aspects on further practical research.Firstly, the third party logistics enterprise logistics alliance synergy innovation dynamic incentive mechanism is designed. As chief of innovation alliance, it hypothesis TPL distribute its member two tasks about logistics services innovation and coordination. The task is divided two stages, the cost of two tasks are interdependent. In the first period, TPL design a linear contract based on the leaguer information, member whereby choice logistics service innovation effort level. At the beginning of the second period, the leader of TPL determine the second period contract parameters according to the observed earlier estimates of actual production service provider first collaborative innovation ability. The conclusion is:the optimal incentive coefficient and the optimal innovation effort levels in the first stage are less than that of the second, but the optimal cooperative innovation effort is just opposite. With the task cost interdependence increasing, the optimal cooperative innovation effort decreases first and then increases. The optimal logistics service innovation effort level in the two stages decreases with the task of cost interdependence. Under a certain condition the two stage dynamic incentive model is better than the single period static incentive model. Logistics alliance collaborative innovation should choose the less interdependent task cost method, the optimal effort level may be controlled well so as to control the innovation benefits.Then principal-agent model based on the behavioral functioning has been built, and the paper researches on the optimal incentive contract when the logistics outsourcing business is overconfidence. Along with the logistics outsourcing overconfidence level decreases, the logistics outsourcing business incentive degree and TPL providers expect income by gradually to its fully rational. When logistics outsourcing overconfidence level must satisfy the constraint conditions, a relatively rational logistics outsourcing, logistics outsourcing overconfidence will bear more of the performance of share coefficient, and along with the increase of the overconfident level. In addition, the client TPL expected income is greater than the logistics outsourcing business reason to expect when income. The TPL and logistics outsourcing achieve a win-win situation. Therefore, overconfidence improves the effectiveness of incentive in a certain degree. When logistics outsourcing business near their overconfidence overconfident level contracting threshold, TPL uses his absolute advantage of business integration to obtain a fixed income, while logistics outsourcing business to undertake all market risk, self-financing. When logistics outsource overconfidence level over their overconfidence tolerance constraint, TPL will be no outsourcing.Based on the subcontractor’s overconfidence research, the customer satisfaction as external supervision variables is considered into the incentive mechanism, and the main parameters and agency cost is analyzed. Research results show that the subcontractor’s overconfidence and customer satisfaction as external supervision can improve subcontractor effort level and innovation accrual allocation coefficient, thus increasing the total logistics service innovation gains. The subcontractor’s effort level and benefit sharing coefficient varies increase with the degree of overconfidence and external supervision. Customer satisfaction supervision mechanism and the subcontractor’s overconfidence can reduce the agency costs, and has the role of replacement, and in a certain range, the agency cost will down with the subcontractor increasing the degree of overconfidence. TPL can achieve the purpose of reducing agency cost it he select the overconfidence subcontractor or strengthen the external supervision according to the actual situation of market.Finally, according to the relationship of cost, exogenous variables and the observability of the effort levels between the tasks that TPL delegate to its subcontractor and external task of subcontractor. Applying the theory of common agency to investigate whether to encourage or limit the subcontractor’s external task. The conclusions is that if the two tasks is independent in random vector and the cost, then the incentive coefficient and subcontractor’s effort level spending on two tasks are independent, then TPL does not need to limit the subcontractor engaging its external business. If the random vectors are independent and the cost are not independent or external business random vector can be observed directly or cannot be observed, the two cost complementary bigger or more replaceable, TPL gives incentive level will be higher. When the two tasks of the exogenous variables have the role of replacement, TPL should limit the subcontractor engaged in external business. But exogenous variables has the role of replacement, the TPL should encourage the subcontractor engaged in such external business. When subcontractor innovation effort can be estimated, principal TPL receives only the fixed income, without limitation subcontractor external business. When subcontractor innovation effort cannot be observed, the subcontractor receives only the fixed income.