| Based on plentiful research data, this thesis focuses on description on"Diwang"situation in state-owned enterprises by the methods of integrating theory with practice and regulating research. This thesis analyzes the harmful impacts and reasons of the generation of"Diwang"situation in state-owned enterprises and based on this analysis, some solutions to"Diwang"situation are provided. This thesis is divided into four parts.The first part is exordium, including research background, meanings of this selected topic, domestic research at present, research thoughts and methods and the construction of the thesis.The second part is the analysis of"Diwang"situation in state-owned enterprises. Firstly, the definition of"Diwang"is given which is divided into total price"Diwang"and unit price"Diwang". Secondly, descriptions on"Diwang"situation in state-owned enterprises at present are provided by means of data. At last, analysis on harmful impacts of"Diwang"situation in state-owned enterprises are presented: impact on rise of the real estate price, impact on macro-control of real estate market, impact on unhealthy development of national economy, and impact on state-owned enterprise's image.The third part is the analysis on the reasons for the generation of"Diwang"situation. The analysis ranges from the institutional factors of state-owned enterprises to the disadvantages of state-owned enterprises. The institutional factors are mainly as follows. The first one is that land"recruit clap hang"system arrangements have flaws. Land"recruit clap hang"system, which is based on the principle of auction, leads to the condition that state-owned enterprises pay great number of capital in order to get land, which is also the main reason for the emergence of"Diwang"situation. The second one is imperfection of stock market financing system arrangements. No matter in the area of bank credit or the area of stock market financing system, state-owned enterprises are superior to other types of enterprises. Therefore, state-owned enterprises come into the land market with great number of capital, raise the price of land continuously, and finally lead to the emergence of"Diwang"situation. The third one is that some local governments sell land in order to increase financial revenue. Most of the earning belongs to local government and this causes the situation that local government conspires with enterprises to raise the price of land in order to get financial revenue. This situation inevitably leads to another"Diwang"situation. State-owned enterprises'own flaws include management supervisors'performance evaluation system, incentive and constraint mechanism and social responsibility. The criterion for management supervisors'performance evaluation system in state-owned enterprises are mainly on financial index, and mostly short term examination, which causes the situation that managers in state-owned enterprises invest in high profit oriented real estate to pass the examination. Therefore, the records of"Diwang"prices are broken regularly. The existence of many layers of principal-agent relationship in state-owned enterprises leads to unclear property right relationship, which causes the absence of incentive and restraint mechanism for state-owned enterprise managers. State-owned enterprises have economic responsibility for making profit, but except that, social responsibility is what they should voluntarily undertake. The emergence of"Diwang"situation totally goes against the social responsibility of state-owned enterprises, which is also the reason why"Diwang"situation draws so much attention.The fourth part is solutions provided to"Diwang"situation in state-owned enterprises. On the context of system, firstly, improving the Land"recruit clap hang"system and changing the auction method by considering other factors comprehensively are very necessary. Secondly, bank and stock market should be perfected and strict loan chase system need to be built up to decrease the possibility for loan capital flowing into land market; promote state-owned listed companies to increase in capital and share, IPO management, and strengthen state-owned enterprises'capital management budget. Third, put the profit made by land transferring fee into the budget management range to form compulsive budget constraint. Fourth, accelerate the supply for living land. Improvements of state-owned enterprises themselves include the following three points. First, scientific criterion for management supervisors'performance evaluation system in state-owned enterprises should be formed. Second, incentive and constraint mechanism in state-owned enterprises need to be improved. At last, state-owned enterprises'social responsibility should be strengthened. State-owned enterprises should drop out from competition for commodity oriented real estate market and enter affordable housing and public houses market in order to fulfill their social responsibility. |
