Models Of CLSC With Hybrid Channels Under Demand Uncertainty

This paper researched a two-stage CLSC, which composed by two members:a manufacturer and a retailer, and which can be seen as three when a third party collector joins in. we discuss two questions concretely:who collecting the used products will maximize the profits of the CLSC system with uncertain demands? And when there are two selling channel and two collecting channel in the system, can they be coordinated for more profits? And how? The questions are the Channel Choosing Problem and Channel Coordination Problem.We select two systems to discuss the Channel Choosing Problem, the difference between the two systems is, one is recycling by one channel while the other is recycling by hybrid channel. The standard for measuring this problem is whether channels can achieves largest system profits. We founded models by the game theory and nonlinear programming, and then carry out a numerical study with the software of Lingo 9.0. With the analysis of numerical study, we obtain conclusion including:if the collecting rate and all the collector's unit collecting cost are stale, then the whole system will get the largest profit when retailer responsible for collecting used products; if the retailer's unit collecting cost is higher than the unit collecting cost of the third party, then when the unit subsidy from the manufacture is stable at a high level, it is the best choice to employ the third party as the collector; while employing the retailer as the collector is the best choice when the subsidy is stable at a low level, etc.We investigate the Channel Coordination Problem with the same processing program like we study the Channel Choosing Problem, which we use the most assumptions in the former problem again. However, there exists some difference in the design of collection parts, where the former is focusing on the system collecting used products with only one channel while the latter with two channels. And this paper directly show the collecting competition between the two channels by introducing a partition parameter to dividing the collection quantity, which can be seen as a way to avoid the appearance of over complex models. We employ a revenue-sharing contract to coordinate some of the numerical results. The conclusions obtained including:in practice, if the unit collecting cost of the retailer and the third part is lower than the manufacture's, then from the perspective of whole system, the collecting combination of retailer with the third part will be the best combination in all the 3 combinations.