The Coordinated Behavior And Government Regulation Between The Housing Market Developers In China

The housing market in most countries and regions all has a typical character with called oligopoly. And the critical character of the monopolistic market is that the oligopoly company may find a way to get out of the Prisoner's Dilemma through repeated games, and reach tacit collution in price. Recently, the housing market in China is developing at a high speed, the housing price stays high with a character as"high price with high vacancy rate". Therefore, to study in collusion in price among the real estate developers will bring a long-term impact in adjusting housing price, improving real estate developers''performance, enhancing government's control to housing market and so on.The math game model established in this thesis is based on the fundamental character of the housing market, focused on several variables such as the amount of the real estate developers, the restriction of supply of products of housing market, the income of the real estate developers, etc. This thesis has studied n actions of tacit collusion in price among symmetric oligarch developers, analyzed the sustainable influence of collusion in price as a result of the amount of the developers and the supply. The conclusion is as follows: 1. Under the condision that the supply of the developers and the demand of the products are already fixed, Nash Equilibrium exists in single-stage game, the collusion in price is achievable in infinite repeated game. 2. Under the condition that the amount of the developers is fixed, the developers are relatively difficult to maintain collusion in price when the supply is restricted less or more. 3. Under the condition that the supply of the developers is fixed, it is relatively difficult to maintain collusion in price when the amount of developers is less or more. In the meanwhile, this thesis has made a study of actions of collusion in price of the real estate developers, reach the conclusion that developers'choice between the strategies of high price or low price is relevant to other developers'income. In addition, the ratio between the developers adopting high price strategy or adopting low price strategy is also relevant to the income of both sides.With regard to the aspect of government control, the control is taken mainly under the following two areas: restricting the demand of housing products and increasing the supply of housing products. Restricting the demand of housing products includes: implementing sales order; raising the purchase cost of housing products which are mainly through increasing the down payment ratio and levying housing tax, etc. Increasing the supply of housing products includes: combating the behaviors of hoarding land and to sell at main chance; the supply of affordable housing and low-rent housing, etc. In the same time, the housing policy should be implemented in a regional differentiation way.Overall speaking, this thesis has made a systemic and comprehensive study of the factors and mechanisms which influencing the developers'collusion in price and also causing the high price collution in housing market, and a construction conclusion has been reached.