Research And Optimization Strategy On Bank- Enterprise's Credit Mechanism Based On Game Analysis

Banks and enterprises are two main bodies in credit markets. Bank-enterprise's relationship is not only affecting the efficiency of banks and enterprises, but also relating to the development of the whole society and economics. Because of asymmetric information, banks are facing adverse selection and moral hazard from enterprises. In this paper, using the game theory, we explored the credit relationship between banks and enterprises, and gave a number of the corresponding solution mechanism. By comparing the analysis of bank-enterprise credit system under different information conditions, we reach a conclusion that the game results of bank-enterprise credit caused inefficient allocation under imperfect information condition. Therefore, reducing the information asymmetry between banks and enterprises is the fundamental way to solve credit risk. Before credit, the bank does not fully master the enterprise information, so it faces the risk of adverse selection. We discuss the formation and affection of adverse selection, and from assessing loan projects and signal transmission to prevent adverse selection risk. After credit, the bank don not know the enterprise how to use of funds and repayment of funds, so the banks faces the risk of moral hazard. We discuss the formation of moral hazard, and from the explicit and implicit incentive mechanism to prevent moral hazard. Finally, based on the model analysis and results, some suggestions are proposed from the perspective of the bank, enterprise, and the whole social environments.