Research On The Customer Manager Compensation System Of Quangzhou Branch Of The China Everbright Bank

In commercial banks, effective incentive compensation can improve the bank's capital adequacy ratio, improving asset quality, increase profitability, but also cultivate human resources and enhance the potential competitiveness at the same time. Compensation Incentive is the remuneration system to encourage and restrain incentives through the design and implementation. Scientific and rational design of compensation system can mobilize employee enthusiasm.Customer manager salary mechanism of commercial banks is essentially a settlement of the agency problem between commercial banks and customer managerse managers. Relative to other basic activities of commercial banks, customer manager's job has its own inherent specificity:on the one hand, customer manager does not work at the commercial bank, but in their respective area of responsibility within the contact with customers. So, unless the increasing the cost of observing,it is difficult to observe a customer manager's effort. On the other hand, in addition to the efforts of customer manager, the sales performance is also affected by many uncertain factors affecting the market, such as the potential demand for the region, clients'psychological factors, competitors'strategies, as well as commercial banks'advertising strategies. Thus, the customer manager'effort can not be inferred directly from the sales which leads to moral hazard.This article firstly overview the relevant compensation theory, discusses the composition and role of salaries. Then mainly analyzes the United States, Germany and Japan's compensation system and summarizes their advanced experience. Subsequently, this article analyzes the Guangzhou Branch of China Everbright Bank's customer manager's compensation mechanism, and described the status of the current customer manager compensation management approach in detail.Then we empirically analyzes the relationship between customer manager's salary levels and performance indicators of the the Guangzhou Branch of China Everbright Bank. We find that the current customer manager salary can only affect the index of deposit and loan. Thus we believe that the manager's salary mechanism of China Everbright Bank is lack of long-term incentive function. And the examination system is irrational. Finally, we design a compensation mechanism for Everbright Bank customer manager optimization solutions,including customer manager base salary, performance salary and benefits. At last we put forward a number of related supporting suggestions.