Research On Reserve Manner Selection And Stock Cost Control For Emergency Materials

How to respond to emergencies is one of the strongest challenges for any country in the world and social organizations. Over the years, the cost of advancement of the society of human beings is always the deterioration of the environment where they live in. Particularly, in recent years, the public health emergencies are increasing. Emergency materials as the basis of their reserves, the level of emergency reserves directly affects the speed of response to emergencies and aid effectiveness. To minimize the loss of the disaster, we need to establish a sound mechanism for emergency management, and management of emergency materials is an important component of emergency management.After Zhangbei earthquake in 1998, China began to establish centers for the reserve system of emergency materials. In the recent emergency rescues, emergency reserves have played a positive role. However, our country is vast and has varieties of disasters, in particular, the outbreak of public health have also increased compared to the previous. Now, the existing reserves can not meet the demand of the current emergency relieves. Emergency reserves would increase the number of materials and raise the level through market forces and social resources, community and corporate reserves.This article firstly illustrated government reserves and corporate reserves. Considering scrapped income of unit material, dynamical update cost of unit materials and frequency of emergency will have different effects in the two reserves, we further study the impact of work on the two reserves. Following, we established the reserve cost functions of government reserve and corporate respectively. Then we find the best way between government reserves and corporate reserves making the stock cost of emergency materials smaller when scrapped income of unit material, dynamical update cost of unit materials and frequency of emergency are changing. Finally, when the corporate reserves emergency materials, we solve the cost allocation between government and corporate using the definition of Shapley value in cooperative game theory.When corporate reserve emergency materials, the relationship between government and corporate is principal - agent relationship. Considering corporate exit moral hazard problems, we use the theory of principal-agent incentive set the rate of rewards and punishments. Following looked into the condition of equitable allocation of cost saving, we established incentive model aimed the maximization of government's cost-saving under the condition of corporate done their best. Finally the numerical example computed the rate of award and punishment and proved that the model can control the stock cost of corporate.