Research On The Principal-Agency Mechanism Of The Country State-Owned Construction Enterprises

With further perfecting of our country Socialist market economy system and the reform and open policy,the construction industry continues to expand,and the state-owned construction enterprises' reform and the development have entered the critical moment.How should our state-owned construction enterprises solve the contradictory and difficult of state asset management,and how to further enhance the benefit,which have became the vital realistic questions to be urgent needs to study the solution.The questions of existing in our state-owned construction enterprises are various,but the main prominent question is principal-agency problem.Therefore,this article,taking the principal-agent theory and game theory as the instruction,has carded on the discussion to the principal-agency problem existing in our state-owned construction enterprises.This paper takes our country state-owned construction enterprises ' principal-agency problems as the research object,uses the standard research primarily, the qualitative investigation and the quantitative investigation unifying,the macroscopic angle of view and the microscopic angle of view unifying,and the theory and practice unifying.The full text altogether divides into six parts.In the theory review foundation,with principal-agency theory,to our country state-owned construction enterprises' principal-agency problems,the article makes a comprehensive combing,discovers principal-agency problems which existing in those enterprises,has mainly carried on the analysis in view of the problems form three aspects,and puts forward our country state-owned construction enterprises' principal-agency problems solving proposals.Firstly,for the state quo of our country state-owned construction enterprises,this paper analysis the courses of those principal-agency problems,and establish a game analysis model of clients and agents' behavior;Secondly,based on the model analysis,for the problems of the state-owned construction enterprises,such as lack of power,this paper studies the designing direction of incentive mechanism and gave some related recommendations;Thirdly,based on the model analysis,for the problems of the state-owned construction enterprises,such as the long principal-agent chain and information asymmetry,this paper studies the establishment of internal and external supervising mechanism from the aspects of regulating corporate governance structure,strengthening internal financial auditing,improving agent evaluation system,and promoting market controlling,legal controlling,and public controlling.Finally,the paper further summarizes the full text,obtains its conclusion of research.