A Study Of Enterprise Strategic Alliances Stability Based On Game Theoretic Analysis

Strategic alliance is an important strategy to obtain competitive advantage and achieve rapid growth. Since the 1980s, strategic alliances are organized all over the world, but the alliance instability seriously has been restricting it further to develop. The purpose here is to find the key factors of causing strategic alliances instable and propose some conditions to realize them stable in a long time.In order to be advantageous for the discussion and the analysis, the strategic alliances have been divided into the latitudinal alliances and the longitudinal alliances based on Porter's Value Chain theory. In Chapter III, while alliance members' collective irrational is analyzed in one game model, repeated game analysis shows that an effective reputation management will help the strategic alliances stable in a long-term cooperation. Chapter IV discuss latitudinal alliance's stability. Three essential conditions have been obtained to realize the latitudinal alliances stable through analyzing a R&D game model. One is to establish a trust mechanism themselves. Two is to construct the core resource balanced share model. Three is to strengthen strategic alliances incomplete contractual governance.The case that strategic alliances of the Japanese auto industry are stabile in a long time is analyzed. The discovery of the case and the conclusions of the game models are quite consistent. It confirmed the viewpoint of this paper more reliable and more guidable.