An Empirical Investigation On The Efficiency Of Managerial Ownership Incentives In The Listed Company

Managerial ownership incentive mechanism is gradually spread in western developed market economic since the last half of 20th century,which is a valid long-term incentives and affects company's development and inner-management.Even if a number of theoretical and empirical accomplishments concerning managerial ownership incentive mechanism have been achieved, it is still in fierce argument that what it brings to us in real corporate operation.Under the process of company system reform, paying attention to the relationship between the managerial ownership incentive and company's achievement,and inherited issues of managerial ownership incentive mechanism,it is worthy thorough analysis.On the academic basis of Human Resource theory,Bailment-agency theory, agent—cost theory, distribute theroy and risk theroy, the thesis specially discuss those following content.First, analyze the actuality of the list company which implement the managerial ownership incentive mechanism in detail. 112 list firms which implement managerial ownership incentive mechanism as swatch in the part ,adopting statistical analysis method.Second, analyze the efficiency of the managerial ownership incentive mechanism in detail .77 list firms which implement managerial ownership incentive mechanism as swatch in the part. At first, under the none-control variable and control variable,analyze the relationship between stock proportion of manager and company's performance.Then, analyze whether exist the curve relation between stock proportion of manager and company's performance. Last, annlyze the relationship between stock proportion of manager and company's performance with interzone stock proportion and classified state ownership.Under the above analyse,the thesis has the following conclusion:First,the listed company which exert managerial ownership incentives,which are mostly in Guangdong,Zhejiang,Hubei province,Shanghai and Beijing; which are mostly manufacturing,information industry,commerce industry, integrated industry;which are mostly privately owned companies.Second,the phenomena with zero stock proportion and lower stock proportion is very prevalent, only 0.005% of stock proportion of manager.Third,the relationship between stock proportion of manager and company's performance is linear relation,not curvilinear relation.Then,the proportion of state have different impact on the Efficiency Of Managerial Ownership Incentives.But,the proportion of stock of manager have no different impact on that.