| For a long time,with the trend of the global economy's development nowadays, regionalization is becoming more and more popular among countries with different economical and cultural background. In 2003,Chinese, Japanese, the South Korea signed and published "China, Japan, and Korea To advance Tripartite Cooperation Joint declaration", symbolized the cooperation entered the new stage. Positively seeking cooperation among China, Japan, and Korea closely raised to the agenda. This article aims at this question. It focuses the attention with the cooperation and the non- cooperation benefit gambling analysis. On the one hand, it analyzed the complementary Index with the United Nations database data( China, Japan, and Korea ).On the other hand, with the analysis of game theory, firstly, it analyzed the probability of China and Japan participation free trade agreement, using effectiveness function solution, secondly, with dynamic game analysis, it asked for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Only the compromise between China and Japan obtains, the FTA among Chinese, Japanese, and Korea can be established smoothly.The article is divided into six parts.Chapter1 elaborated the background of non-cooperation gambling theory development, the situation of domestic and foreign research, the aim and method of the paper. Chapter2 mainly introduced the development background of the world regional economics, the progress of China, Japan, and Korea cooperate, as well as the pattern choice. Third chapter and the fourth chapter are the core of this paper. Chapter 3 analyzed the cooperation among Chinese, Japanese, and Korea with the complementary Index. It emphasizes on the complementary relationship. Chapter 4 analyzed the non-cooperation, from static game to dynamic game. Chapter 5 explained the prospects and tendency of region cooperation development. Some some policy suggestions have been proposed. Chapter6 summarizes the whole conclusions of this paper. |
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