On The Firm's Property Rights Of The Knowledge Factor's Owner

Content:Corporate governance is a worldwide theory and practical topic, and it is also one of the hot topics. Since the GHM model made creative study to economic theory, economists have been paying more attention to the firm rights. However, the logic of the"capital might view"and the shareholder supremacy is unconvincing; the analysis of the"human capital", which is still kept in the frame of the principal-agent theory, is hard to let us obtain an accurate understanding. Thus, in this paper I study the residual rights of control and the property rights of the firm from the view of the knowledge factor, managing to get the new understanding.There are six chapters in this paper. In Introduction chapter I propose the questions, analyze the meaning of my research, make great emphasis on the research methods, and explain the research frame and the context arrangement.The second chapter is the literature review. In this chapter the GHM model is defined as the dividing point, the firm theory is re-researched and commented on simply. The principal-agent theory, GHM model, the firm rights theory, the competence and knowledge theory are largely introduced.The third chapter explains the firm and property rights of the firm based on the residual rights of control, in which the incomplete contract formed the firm is discussed; the incompletion of the firm contract is connected with the transaction form IV and relational contract is illustrated. At the same time I also introduce the productive and co-operative rents of the firm. I also re-define the residual rights of control, for the first time the factor constituting the firm are differentiated from that composing the residual rights of control, the important residual rights of control are emphasized, and argue that the core competence of the firm is stem from the heterogeneity and scarcity of the knowledge factor. Based on this, in this chapter I firstly differentiate between the ownership of the firm and the property rights of the firm.The fourth chapter discusses the allocation in the property rights of the firm, in which I establish a model about allocation of property rights applying the co-operative game theory. I firstly point that the purpose of allocation of the property rights is the creativity of the co-operative rent, prove the property rights efficiency about the scarcity of the knowledge factor, and analyze how the allocation of the firm property promote the investment of specific knowledge.The fifth chapter is on the basis of the revolution in the important residual rights of control, making use of the firm evolution to discuss the corporate governance and the evolution in the property rights. In the entrepreneurial firm,"the united entrepreneurs"hold the property rights of the firm alone; in the managerial firms, the allocation of the property rights of the firm is influenced by lots of factors, all of which the scarce specific knowledge is the most important one. In the dynamic evolution involving the firm governance, it is essential that the scarcity of the knowledge factor relatively vary, which consequently affect their relative roles and status, and at last change the firm governance and the allocation of the property rights of the firm.The sixth chapter is the conclusion, in which I briefly draw a conclusion of this research, explain the shortcomings in my research and set my future aims in the study of this area.