Research On The Effectiveness Of Corporate Governance Of Listed Companies In Jilin Province

Corporate governance came into shape in the 1980s. In the 1980s and 1990s, the research on corporate governance was regarded. With the outbreak of the Asian Financial and fraud scandals of American listed companies, e.g. Enron Corp, WorldCom, Xerox Corporation at the very beginning of this century, corporate governance has become a global focus. In China, It has not been long since the setup of modern enterprise mechanism and the time for practicing corporate governance is even shorter. With the further development of security market and the setup of modern enterprise mechanism in listed companies, governance problems in these companies began to show up .The essence that the corporate governance is a distribution question about arranging the power and interests of the company. The power arrangement and distribution of interests is one of most important decisive factor to company performance. The modern corporate governance is composed of the internal governance mechanisms relying mainly on the shareholder, the directorate and the manager and the external governance mechanisms such as the stock market, the bond market, the manager market and the product market. All these mechanisms are not independent, on the contrary, they are interrelated with one another. Because the mechanisms can promote or substitute one another, the whole corporate governance system's effect on corporate performance is not equal to the sum of each governance mechanism's effect. Seeing about the corporate governance mechanisms systematically and correlatively is very important to the construction of modern corporate governance structure.Corporate governance is a kind of contract arranging, because these contracts replace some parts market, the cost of trade are saved and insure the kinds of power scheme and maximum interest ,and it refers chiefly principal-agency relation and the cost of agency. In accordance with governance participant, corporate governance is partitioned into corporate internal governance and corporate exterior governance. Corporate governance efficiency is the extent of a company achieve effective corporate governance. For the corporate internal governance, the efficiency lie on perfect corporate structure's design and corporate mechanism arranging. For the corporate exterior governance, the efficiency lie on the extent of corporate intendance and market restriction.At present, there are singularly the researches on regional corporate governance. the research on JiLin province listed companies is much less. I think the difference among every province's the level of economy and market development result in the different governance efficiency. Based on governance structure theory and analyzing the stock market's characters and the actuality of listed companies in our country, this paper selects 20 JiLin province listed companies as case study samples to make correlative empirical studies, through computing EVA and the basal growth rate, and recapitulates elementarily JiLin province listed companies'actuality. Here is the paper's innovation.The chief research of governance mechanism is shareholder meeting, board of directors, board of supervision and the management, and there are some find hereinafter. The ownership structure of JiLin province listed companies is concentrated. The ownership of the state-owned shares takes more proportion and the current shares less. There is not the remarkable correlative relation between the ownership structure and corporate performance. The executive take more proportion in the member of board of directors. Independent directors become more, but many come from the large shareholder. The prompting mechanism's effect is not obvious at directors'salary and the quantity of the directors-owned shares. Board of supervision's proper size, but inside supervisor are more, and the pluralism status common, so board of supervision have less effect. There are many pluralism in the management. There is not the remarkable correlative relation between the salary of the management and corporate performance. The less quantity of the management -owned shares make prompting effect unobvious. Although there some errors because of calculate and the sample choice, but the conclusion are still worthy.For the above matter, this paper suggests: 1.we should establish conditionality ownership structure, provide protection to small investors, separate government management from enterprise management. 2.we should enhance directors'themselves management and restriction legally., set up benefit protection, encourage independent directors to hold shares.3. we should introduce independent exterior supervisor, ensure their daily job, clear their function, distinguish function between they and independent directors. 4. we should increase the proportion of the management -owned shares, carry out Incentive Stock Option as early as possible. 5. we should perfect information publicity system, use organization investors'active effect, develop the manager market and outside market mechanism.Corporate governance is a very important and complex issue, their research has yet to be studied in more depth.