Research On Construction Agent System Management Mode Of Government Investment Project

With the transformation of the government functions and the reformation of our country's investment and financing system, the position and function of government investment is still very important as it taking the responsibility in reaching the requirement of public demand, although nowadays its proportion in social fixed assets investment has been decreased. For a long time, phenomenon of "Three-excess ", exceeding investment, exceeding scale and exceeding standard, has partly taken place in the construction of our government investment project. Apparently, the reason is that some project enterprises lack of specialty experience in management. Actually, the inside reasons is the deficiency of restrictive mechanism for government investment. Construction agent system will make a further change in the government functions, meanwhile, it can change the every kind of irregularity in the traditional project management mode of government invest developments item.The characteristics and classification of the government investment project, as well as the disadvantages of the model of traditional management are discussed systematically in this dissertation. It researches about the types and characteristics of construction agent system, and then analyzes the agent relationship by using the multi-mission principal agent theory, in addition, the factors, such as inscrutability of engineering quality assignment and substitution of effort cost function of taking the tasks, which should be full considered in the design of inspiration mechanism in project agent, has been proposed in multi-mission principal-agent relationship .It required to choose different coefficient of encouraging intension according to various management goals in order to encourage construction agent to arrange the reasonable effort input, avoiding the weakening of encouraging efficiency. In this way, it can protect the possible moral risk effectively. It also discusses the original construction agent system and its existing reason through the transaction cost and institutional shift based on the new institutional economics."Dislocate","offside" and "defaulted" phenomenon of the government function, are existed in traditional management system, increasing the transaction cost and diminishing marginal revenues. The former system will be renew with the descending marginal benefit when transaction cost is positive value and increases constantly. If the new system makes the expected net income exceed the cost, the system innovation has been put forward, that is to bring the construction agent system for government investment.