The Multi-Attribute Auction And Its Application In Government Procurement

The completed analysis:of Multi-attribute auction is proposed firstly by Che,which has.been widely noticed by economical field.Since the single-attribute auction can not meet the real demand,many economists have done a lot of theoretical and experimental research on the Multi-attribute auction,and they have made some achievements.We focus on three auction protocols for the case of multi-attribute items;a variation of the first-price sealed-bid protocol termed first-score sealed-bid,a variation of the second-price sealed-bid protocol termed second-score sealed-bid,and a variation of the English auction protocol termed sequential full information revelation.We analyze a auction model for these protocols and we provide optimal and stable strategies for the auctioneer and for the bidder participating in multi-attribute auctions under three different utility functions.In addition,we analyze the auctioneer's/buyer's expected payoff and suggest an optimal scoring rule to be announced according to the protocol.Finally,we reveal that the buyer's expected payoff in all three protocols,the first-score-sealed-bid auction,the second-score sealed-bid auction and the multi-attribute English auction,differ only by a predefined constant.We prove that the optimal scoring rule is equal in all three protocols.This result can be interpreted as the extension of the equivalence theory of the single attribute for the case of multi-attribute items.Finally,we apply the multi-attribute auction in government procurement,analyze it using the example of the activity of"home wiring entering into village"which aims to enlarge country's need by the government,and discuss the process of the reverse multi-attribute auction in detail.