The Distribution Of Value-Added Income From Land Expropriation

During the process of industrialization and urbanization, land resources always transfer from agricultural purposes to commercial and industrial uses. The problem is how to make it happen by changing the owners or users of the land from the peasants or rural collectives to enterprises or towns. According to China's specific national conditions and characteristics of the stage of economic development, the policy approached by our country includes three steps: at first, the local government expropriates the peasants'or rural collective land, so the rural land belongs to the country or the local city, then the government sells it in the market to meet the need for land from industrial and commercial enterprises. There has been such a problem in the process as: How much should be offered by the government when it expropriates the rural land?First and foremost, this article introduces research methods and research perspective in the field and related at home and abroad. At the theoretical support and infrastructure of that, the thesis focuses on how to segment the value added income (the margin from how much the government got for selling the land minus how much it paid for expropriating the farmers'land) between the government and the farmers. Then, at the consideration there's cost and revenue spillover when rural land changes into city use, we assume that the government is on the behalf of social benefits, so we can add those factors into government's behavior. Now we can use economical supply and demand model to analyze the different government-land-supply curve based on the different stages of economic development, and together with the assumed enterprise-land-demand curve, we can get price and quantity set by the market force. So given the expropriation price government set for farmers, we can easily arrive at the value-added income of land.After all these theoretical preparation, we can introduce our prime model to segment the value-added income between two parties. Given the set relevant parameters, we model the land expropriation process as a game, the bargaining skill and the ability of the developer and the land owner withstanding risks selected as the determinant factors influencing the ultimate transaction price. The model analyzes how the developer and the land owner share the benefits to reach a reasonable an mutually acceptable price based on the utility maximization principle.Based on the sensitive analysis of the related parameters, we can dig out the deeper reasons in legal system why farmers are at a disadvantage of much less segmentations from the value-added revenue from the their land and what should be done in present circumstance to protect the farmers'right to process and build a harmonious society together. At last, the thesis gives its political advice on how to improve the relevance of the current system to segment the value-added income from land expropriation properly and reasonably. On one hand, we should establish a scientific incentive mechanism and strengthen the supervision mechanism for government action. On the other hand, we should improve the land dispute settlement mechanism to enhance the voice of farmers in the distribution of value-added income and strengthen the protection of the farmers'right to a fair return from its land.