Research On R&D Model Selection And Dynamic Stability Of Cooperating R&D Network

Facing increasingly fierce marketing competition, firms must build up the core competitive advantages and continual completive power through in-depth R&D in order to have a regular place in the world market. There are three models for R&D: independent R&D, consigned R&D and cooperating R&D. Firm's R&D model is controlled by two factors: technique spill-over and learning ability. Essentially, the process of cooperating R&D among firm is a series of game process during which firm try to make use of others'resources and meanwhile protect its resources from utilizing by others.Given the technique spill-over level and learning capability, this article provides a static model of duopoly firm by game theory. In this thesis, it analyzes duopoly firm's R&D and puts forward the existence conditions of Nash equilibrium. It also discusses the relationship between Nash equilibrium and absorbing capacity and technique spill-over. It makes an equilibrium analysis about the game of choice between independent R&D,consigned R&D and cooperating R&D, which has a corresponding equilibrium strategy respectively. Lastly, it compares equilibrium solutions of firm'cost-effective decreasing amplitude and a maximum profit in three R&D models.Firm can make full use of internal technical knowledge if they choose cooperating R&D when they have a higher level of spill-over technique and better learning capability, thereby achieving their R&D purpose and gaining a maximum profit.The research net form of researching could fulfill the aim that all firms under the net may share, use, and process their all techniques, at the mean while, the overflow of the firm techniques will get the best level. Partners can learn from each other and absorb the shared-knowledge from the overflow. Integrating with the self-owned knowledge, the firms can strengthen their old, at the same time; they still get their basement for the further research..The cooperating R&D model easily gets the result that its members disobey the commitment and make the research net instability just because the organization of the form not founded from the force measure controlling of the administration and economy.This thesis applies game analysis to point out stability problems of cooperating D&R network. It firstly analyzes firms'strategic decision under complete information, by'mutual noncooperation model','mutual cooperation model'and'unilateral cooperation model'obtains Nash equilibrium of D&R strategic decision on cooperating D&R network. And then it analyzes strategy problems of D&R network dynamic stability under incomplete information from three aspects. Firstly,'participant strategy model'analyzes participants'strategy in cooperating D&R network by replicating the dynamic equation. Secondly,'discount factor'stability model quantifies the values of discount factor of D&R network so that stability problems on network can be analyzed quantitatively, which the greater discount rate on values received in the future is, the more stable the D&R network. Thirdly,'product relation'stability model studies the impact generated by product relation of firms in cooperating D&R network and it shows that the more competitive the more unstable the network; in contrast, the more complementary the product relation is, the better the network stability. Consequently, upstream and downstream firms in the chain of vertical D&R model can better ensure the stability of cooperating D&R network.