A Research On The Impact Of Debt's Corporate Governance Over Cash Dividends Policy

Agent theory suggests that dividend policy can solve the agent's problem what due to the separation of ownership and management rights, but the conclusions are set up in the West Country's capital market. This article based on the reality of China and analyses the dividend policy of listed companies in China from the point of view of agency theory. In theory in this paper viewed on the theory of agent from the enterprise perspective, we make an analysis of modern enterprise existence of different interests between the principal agent conflicts. The cash dividends policy, regardless of as means of inter-agent problem to shareholders - the management, or as a major channel of the Major shareholders to grab small and medium-sized instrument, are the areas of corporate governance. Cash dividends at no cost automatically to solve agent problem, we should exert effects of debt financing corporate governance, and promote t the level of corporate governance, reduce agency costs and protect the interests of small and medium investors.This paper selected assets liabilities ratio and other indicators to measure the level of corporate debt financing. We regard the listed companies of stock markets of Shanghai who pay cash dividends among 2005 -2007 year and used descriptive statistics method to study the relationship between cash dividends policy and debt financing. Empirical results show that debt financing can alleviate the agent problem of cash dividend policy, and different debt maturity structure, and different Ultimate control of people will have a different effect. Finally, in view of agent problem embodied cash dividend policy of listed companies in China, we proposed some recommendations to promote the healthy development of capital market...