The Research On Price Decision Models Of The Closed-loop Supply Chain Under Asymmetric Information

The importance of the environmental performance in sustainable manufacturing and service operations is being widely recognized, which leads many enterprises to focus on the value of their end-of-life(EOL) products by remanufacturing. The reason for remanufacturing lies not only in the environmental policy, but also in the fact that more and more manufacturers have found it could help them decrease cost and increase profit. However, most of related research on closed-loop supply chain were based on symmetry information, that is, the members of the closed-loop supply chain fully disclose their demand or cost informations to each other. In fact, enterprises often take their own informations(for example, cost information) as trade secrets in order to protect their profit, and it is not easy for other enterprises to fully understand these informations. The thesis proposes closed-loop supply chain pricing strategies under asymmetric information based on reality, discusses the optimal decision and economy profits of the manufacturer and the retailer in the closed-loop supply chain under both symmetry and asymmetric information by means of measurable model analysis, with game theory and optimization method as tools, analysis the retailer's misreporting under asymmetric information, and analysis the influence on every member caused by the retailer's misreporting through a comparison of the pricing strategies under two conditions.The activities of producting, saleing, used products callback and recovery are mainly among manufacturers, retailers and consumers, as the key participatants in the closed-loop supply chain, the thesis first introduces the functions, typical activities and relations with others at the beginning, which makes a well preparation for the later researches.Based on the general framework of closed-loop supply chain described above, in Chapter Three we build a pricing model of the closed-loop supply chain under symmetry information, we address the problem of how the manufacturer set appropriate wholesale price and the price of buying end-of-life products from the retailer, how the retailer set appropriate retail price and the price of buying end-of-life products from the consumers. In Chapter Four, on the consideration of asymmetric information in reality, we assume that only the retailer is fully aware of his own callback cost of end-of-life products and the manufacturers do not know the callback cost of the retailer, we build two pricing models of the closed-loop supply chain under asymmetry information. In model 1, the manufacturer accept the callback cost declared by the retailer. In this case, the retailers will exaggerate his callback cost, the consequence is: on one hand, the manufacturer increases the price of buying end-of-life products from the retailer, on the other hand, the retailer reduces his price of buying end-of-life products form the consumers, resulting in a decrease of the quantity of end-of-life products, so the manufacturer products more new products and less recovery products. The retailer's misreporting increases his own profit, decreases the manufacture's profit and the total profit of the supply chain system. In model 2, we assume that the manufacturer uses his own estimate of the retailer's callback cost. Model 2 shows that the manufacture can improve his own expectation profit if he use his own estimate in the case of his estimate is accurate enough. So, as the leader of the game against the retailer, the manufacturer will use his own estimate rather than believe the retailer's decleared callback cost.