Research On Supply Chain Coordination Model With Two Competitive Retailers

With the development of scientific and technological progress, world economic integration and personalized customer demand, supply chain management is gradually becoming a hot topic in business and academia. Supply chain is formed by a number of independent accounting enterprises or enterprises with a different department. The members are often emergence of "double marginalization", for target inconsistent benefits or lack of effective communication, which leads to the lower overall effectiveness of the supply chain. In order to effectively manage the supply chain and achieve optimal overall performance, supply chain members must be a highly coordinated manner to cooperate. Because coordination has been viewed as an important means of supply chain's firmness and operation, the problem how to coordinate the supply chain has been attracted broad attention of business and academia. And analysis and study on coordination in SCM are of great significance in theory and practice.On the basis of some research results about the supply chain coordination, this paper concentrates on a supply chain in which there are one supplier and two retailers with different competitive behaviors. The paper also assumes that the supplier acts as a Stackelberg leader, and studies three main aspects. First, this paper supposes symmetric information and uses the price contract to regulate and coordinate the action of the supplier and two retailers. It also gives different choice of one supplier and two retailers when the two retailers take Cournot and Collusion strategies respectively. The results show that the whole supply chain can achieve optimal state and be fully coordinated. It also designs the profit distribution model; Then, this paper assumes asymmetric information and uses quantity discount contract to coordinate actions of the supplier and retailers when they take Cournot and collusion strategies respectively. Finally, the paper considers the commercial promotion under symmetric information and the retailers' promotion policies will affect the demand for product. It uses subsidy policy to coordinate actions of the supplier and retailers when they take Cournot and collusion strategies respectively. The results are analyzed by conducting numerical examples.