Dampening Effect Of Retaliation Threat On Antidumping Decision

More and more scholars find evidence that antidumping in the present world is no longer a response to dumping but a mean of international protection. So, it is siganificant talking about the factors to affect the antidumping decision more than comparing the cost products and its export price, and of which, the dampening effect of retaliation threats is more interesting.In this paper we firstly introduce Blonigen&Bown's work which studied the dampening effect of retaliation threats in the stages of industry level and country level. The purpose we doing this is to make the the differences on mathod and process more clear. Their paper found strong evidence that retaliation threats have siganificant effect on dampening antidumping decision. But I doubt if the structure of 1 vs X(X here is more than one country) has positive effect on the conclusion, as a result of which I use the structure lvs 1 to confirm the retaliation threats effect from some country.In this paper we study retaliation threats effect on antidumping decision with the data connected to the investigation on products from China filed by the United States. In the regress progress I use the product level data in stead of country level data to represent import factor. It is nomal using product level data when you considering which product should be punished. And about retaliation threat we consider two aspects:antidumping channel and WTO dispute settelment channel while they just consider WTO dispute settlement channel in the country decision stage. The reason why I do this is that I think antiduming channel is more siganificant because dispute settlement retaliation is limited. And more, I think it is a symmetrical structure in the game, export growth is a must variable since we have import growth variable in consideration.With the logit specification we find that the United State worries about retaliation from China which induses the negative decision to be made. Antidumping retaliation threat have better effect on dampening positive decision than the WTO dispute settlement retaliation, which is consistent with rule that retaliation through dispute settlement machenism is limited. And we also find here that product level import data is a better choice than the country level import data.Just like what many experts on international trade suggest, we should make full use of Antidumping Law and WTO dispute settlement machenism, protecting native products in native market for one thing, dampening frenquent antidumping investigation for another.