A Study On Incentive Mechanism Design Of "Lead-member" Strategic Alliance Based On Profit Distribution And Technology Sharing

More and more enterprises seek sustainable competitive advantage through establishing a strategic alliance, and the"lead-member"strategic alliance is a more common form in strategic alliances. The game rules in the alliance are usually made by the lead company, but the member companies themselves determine whether to participate and how to display their preferences. But the strategic alliance may often lead to failure for the members will choose opportunistic free-riding tendency. Using mechanism design theory, the article studies that under the information asymmetry condition, the lead company design the game rules, using profit distribution and technology sharing simultaneously, in order that the members show their own personal information, and adopt the conducive which can maximum the profit of alliance, and last prevent members company of the "reverse option" in order to achieve best goals.The study indicates that: (1)The complexity of modern economic activity,high-input,high-risk, the severer and more volatile situation of international political and economic result in increasingly fierce competition among enterprises. In order to survive and develop, nurture and enhance the competitiveness, various of business alliances based on sharing and collaboration awareness bring the attention of entrepreneurs, and they establish an alliance includes both competition and cooperation. As a new form of organization, the"lead-member"strategic alliance is a more common form in strategic alliances; (2)The theory of mechanism is accepted for it study how to achieve the goals under the condition of the dispersion of information and information asymmetry base to its rational economic assumptions. So using the theory of mechanism to design"lead-member"strategic alliance incentives in accordance with the strategic alliances'own attributes and attitudes, can better overcome problems of asymmetric information in real life to disposition the resources effectively.The study shows that: (1) In the"lead-member"strategic alliance, the game rules are usually made by the lead company, but the member companies themselves determine whether to participate and how to display their preferences. In order to prevent the "adverse selection" problem, encourage the members to show their own personal information and achieve the gale of conducting the member companies to make the greatest contribution becomes an important issue of the theory of "chief and– member" strategic alliances. (2)The leader should use the profit distribution and technology sharing simultaneously in the design of incentives, and gives the members different drives accords their different abilities. The result shows that the leader company should choose companies whose abilities have big differences as the members of an alliance, and gives larger profit allocation ratio to the higher ability member company, under the premise that all members share the same the ratio of technology-sharing.To ensure incentives of"lead-member"strategic alliance model realize, the paper also optimizes in the institutional and organizational and give the relevant evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency. For the incentive of"lead-member"strategic alliance optimization model is not necessarily broken, in reality, we should use computers and related software tools to solve according to the specific functional form.