Study On R&D Outsourcing Contract Based On Uncertainty Condition

As a result of technical and market uncertainty, enterprise which is carrying on the product R&D independently will have to face the huge potential risk. And the R&D outsourcing is an appropriate way to solve the problem. On one hand, R&D outsourcing is helpful for the contracts concentrating their own core business, accelerating development speed, reducing the R&D cost, and decentralizing R&D risk. However, on the other hand, the R&D outsourcing will have the possibility on giving the contract a series of new risks which is resulted from the contractor behavior's uncertainty. Therefore, the strategies of contracts'R&D outsourcing, which can reduce the risk caused by technical, market and the contractors'behavior uncertainty, will be critical for the products'R&D.In this paper, the main line was R&D outsourcing, and the R&D outsourcing's strategies were studied under the uncertainty condition. The paper mainly launched the research work from the following several aspects: It makes a fully identification of uncertainty on R&D outsourcing process, then analysis those sources of uncertainty, specific forms, and the impact of uncertainty on R&D outsourcing. Under uncertain conditions, it analysis in the principal investment strategy and the R&D outsourcing incentives system. The research method combines qualitative with quantitative methods: firstly, based on non-deterministic, the cost theory, resource dependence theory, core competence and other theories, making a qualitative description on R&D decision-making. Secondly, based on uncertainty conditions, by setting up option theory models, making a quantitative study on investment strategy for R&D outsourcing selection. Finally, based on market uncertainty, by establishing a reputation for theoretical models, makes a quantitative incentives study on R&D outsourcing. The results show that: first, outsourcer and contractor jointly hold options, can reduce the risks of research to realize the maximum value of the project; the other hand, by outsourcer or contractor unilaterally hold option, then the maximum value of the project can not be achieved. Second, the reputation of theoretical models can be achieved under certain conditions, the reputation of effective incentive mechanism can prevent the opportunistic behavior of the contractor and reduce the risk of outsourcer.This thesis research can help reducing risks result from uncertainty of R&D itself and R&D outsourcing process, increasing R&D performance, providing a theoretical reference for R&D outsourcing enterprise.