Game Of The Eu Anti-dumping Analysis

Anti-dumping is one of the legitimate rights which WTO entrust to the import country for considerable self-protection. In recent years, the enterprises of our country suffer again and again western countries dumping accusations. In fact, anti-dumping already seriously affected the healthy development of the export trade of our country. China has become the biggest victimized country . Since the enterprises of our country lacks understanding for dumping and anti-dumping knowledge, lacks experience in anti-dumping lawsuit. We often lose a lawsuit. It not only make enterprise self have suffered serious pecuniary loss, and have harmed the image of our country in international trading field.Combing theory with practice , qualitative research with quantitative research, the modern game theory with the traditional Chinese game thought, this paper applies game theory to interpret how we fight against European Union(EU) when they take the initiative in anti-dumping toward us. This paper makes realistic sense on economics and strong sense on practice.This paper tries to make game theory to analyze the anti-dumping problems we encountered. In order to make deeper research on it, I focus this question in China and EU. The primary coverage goes as follows. In foreword, there is an introduction of the current situation of anti-dumping between China and EU and the meaning of this essay's research. In the first , I mainly talked about the charging organization of anti-dumping investigation in EU and about the procedure of administrative investigation ,the procedure of administrative censor and the procedure of litigation of anti-dumping in EU.And I also made a gambling analysis of trade protection on anti-dumping. In the second, I discussed the economic effect on dumping about exporting and importing countries from positive aspect and negative aspect. In the third, I make two models. One is about anti-dumping litigation. The other is about respondent anti-dumping of two corporations spreading into "n" corporations. In the forth ,applying the method of game theory ,the paper establishes the static and dynamic anti-dumping game models between China and EU. In the fifth , a game model of a corporation participating judicial proceedings was made. In the last, combining with the comparing analysis in the chapter 3,chapter 4 and the chapter 5, I pointed out where our anti-dumping laws needed to perfect further. Then gathering the conclusions and suggestions , I profound many constructive suggestions to our country .I have come to the conclusions as below based on the essay. Firstly, there's a conclusion that the probability of the corporation taking part in litigation and the amount of the same product's corporations were in reverse proportion. Secondly, there's an anlysis that the probability of failure to respond to litigation of every corporation would be increasing with the same more corporations. Thirdly,I made tests of hypothesis and drew three conclusions through establishing the static and dynamic anti-dumping game models between China and EU. Based on the conclusions I summarized the dumping strategy wouldn't be adopted in labor-intensive industries provided with obviously comparative advantage. The last conclusion is that though many sued corporations won't like to apply for final judicial proceedings because of the large expense they should sacrifice current benefits to execute judicial proceedings for the protecting the benefits of our country and themselves.