Imports Of Goods, False Reporting Behavior Research, Mechanisms And Policies On The Regulation

Since the customs improve the ability of striking the smuggling crimes, the smuggling behavior of corporations in importing goods has been changed into the "intelligent" type from the original "extensive-like" type, in which the corporations illegally import goods from foreign counties without declaring to the customs. In importing declaration of goods, the corporation knows the real information of importing goods, while the customs does not. Then, there exists the asymmetric information between the corporations and the customs. As a result, the corporation has the incentives to falsify the information of the importing goods, such as prices, quantities, goods types, etc., on importing declaring in order to gain the illegally addling income. To the best of my knowledge, this thesis is the first attempt to analyze the falsifying behavior in importing declaration in theory, and provide insights to the customs in both policy designing and organizations reforming.This thesis involves three main sections. The first is the background of topic, the second is the theoretical research, and the last one is the application research. The more detail information is listed as following.In the background analysis, the thesis summarizes the development of monitoring policy and mechanism reforming in importing declarations since 1949. Furthermore, the thesis shows that the current monitoring policy can not effectively cope with the falsifying behavior in importing declarations because of the asymmetric information between the corporations and the customs.In the theoretical research, with the support of game theory and information economics theory, this thesis builds a game model to study the interplays between the customs and the corporation in the proceeding of importing declaration. The results in the model show that there are three main factors which induce the falsifying behavior in importing declaration. The first one is that the customs has a high cost to monitor the falsifying behavior in importing declaration; The second one is that the lying corporations suffer the weak penalty based on customs' current monitoring policies; The current monitoring mechanism of customs does not deal with the principle-agent problems in importing declarations. In the application research, based on the results of the above two sections, the thesis regards the Declaration Department in Shanghai Customs as a studying case, and explores how the mechanism reforming impacts the falsifying behavior in importing declaration. Fascinatingly, in terms of policy designing and mechanism reforming of the customs, the thesis provides some valuable insights to deal with the falsifying behavior in importing declarations.Therefore, the thesis has the obvious value in both theory and application to handle the falsifying behavior in importing declarations. The more detail contents are described in this thesis.