Investor Oversight System For Large-scale Enterprise Groups Studied

In the market economy of socialism, the establishment of efficient supervision on the manager is an important part of the mission to enhance and improve the modern corporation institution. To correctly analyze the problem that currently exists in the mechanism of supervision and restriction, to explore a new means and method of the mechanism under the circumstance of the system of state-owned asset management, and to ensure the assets to maintain or rise are the urgent tasks.At present, there are many forms of supervision, where are performed by the laws, the party, the audit system, by the employees, and etc.. Moreover, there are extra forms of the supervision from different organizations and systems, such as the independent director system, the board of supervisors system, accountants assignment system. To some extent, we can draw a conclusion that a supervision mechanism has been established. The mechanism has do some work from the corporation of the systems listed above. However, with the deepening of the reform process, the shortcomings of the traditional mechanism become obvious. For example, the mechanism cannot perform well because of the intersection of itself. The problem that the mechanism is multifarious but inane is so severe. The crux of the problem is the vacancy of the assets owner. The experience form the developed countries shows that the status of the asset owner should be the core of the supervision system in the form of principle-agent mode, and only in this way, can a sufficient supervision mechanism with low running-cost be established.The purpose of this paper is to search for a sufficient and suitable supervision mechanism by the owner in the corporations of large scale. With reference of the experience from abroad, a mechanism can be set up when making use of the advantage of our system and raising the participation enthusiasm of the society. This paper has six parts. The first part is to discuss the problems of the traditional supervision mechanism. Through analysis of the problem, the second part of this paper finds the crux of the problem, namely, the vacancy of the assets owner, which is the actual reason of the lack of sufficient supervision. The third part provides a dissertation on the issue of mechanism improvement. The fourth part briefly introduces the mechanisms of state-owned corporations in developed countries (America, British, France, German and Japan). With analysis on our domestic corporations and reference from abroad, the fifth part tries to find a mode for domestic Corporations. The last part tries to design a frondose structure of the mechanism with the core of owner status, definitely, that is to build and enhance the mechanism of stimulation and restriction on the managers and the board of directors, to improve the mechanism that ensures normal functions of the board of supervisors, dependent directors and the assigned accountants. When the structure designed above is built, the supervision mechanism in the domestic state-owned corporation would be suitable for our reality and would show its sufficient performance.