| In China, there are many kinds of tourism resources ranking highly and distributing densely, which lays a good natural endowment foundation of resources for the development of tourism industry. According to the international experience, a high yield will not be achieved unless a great deal of fund is injected into tourism industry. However, the shortage of capital has always been the bottleneck, which handicaps the transformation from tourism resources into tourism products. Therefore,as a new phenomenon, the Division of the Proprietary Right and Operation (DPO) gives us a good chance to achieve the linkup between the tourism resources and social funds. There is a heated discussion about DPO: some people think highly of it, while others fight heavily against it. After collecting adequate and detailed materials, the author tries to give a reasonable and systematic thought of his own towards this issue.This thesis can be divided into four parts.The first part, which is the theoretical basis of the whole thesis, aims at introducing some basic theories about Property Rights to Tourist Resources (PRTR). At first, the author defines tourism resources and property rights respectively, and then pays great attention to their attributes. After that, he gives PRTR a logical definition. By this means, he analyzes the characteristics of PRTR, for example, public interest, external effect and so on.The second part gives a brief review of the evolution or change of PRTR, which includes three periods. From the review, the DPO's historical necessity is disclosed. Therefore, according to the modes of Bifeng Gorge and Mount Huang, the author empirically investigates DPO's economic performance from three angles: the protection of tourismresources, business performance and contribution to local economic development. The third part discusses the main defects of DPO and the factors, which hinder it. According to the Principal-agent theory, DPO can be considered as a dual-layer agency; that is to say, it is a mixture of administrative behavior and economic behavior. So it has these natures: the dual-layer agency structure, the adhesions of the administrative power to property right, longitudinal chains and latitudinal pluralism of the government's representative.The author thinks that there exist some defects about DPO: 1 The composition of property rights is out of balance. 2 National ownership is unclear and its realization is ambiguous. 3 The property rights are not defined clearly. The emphasis is put on the realization of them. 4 The function of property rights, such as motivation, restraint, uncertain-reduction, is incomplete.Furthermore, he probes into the restraint and supervision system of DPO: 1 The supervision derived from proprietary right is invalid.2 The government's supervision should be improved.3 The law and regulation system is imperfect.4 Selecting-managers mechanism has not been set up.The fourth part focuses on the countermeasures and suggestions to improve DPO. In this part, the author expounds his own four suggestions. Firstly, it is crucial to set up operating and managerial system of PRTR, in which the most important thing is to establish the full-time organizations to manage PRTR. The author emphasizes the definition of its nature and function. Secondly, it is urgent to cultivate and perfect exchange market of PRTR. Thirdly, it is important to strengthen government's supervision further. Finally, it is necessary to improve and recreate law and regulationsystem.All in all, three innovations have been tried: First, innovation in theory. According to the Principal-agent theory, the author explores the essence and characteristics of DPO. Followed by this, some defects about DPO are disclosed. Then, the author draws a conclusion that it is inefficient if government acts as the representative of ownership.Second, innovation in structure. The thesis is based on the methodology of the Marxian materialist dialect. On the one hand, being a... |
PDF Full Text Request