Analysis Of Small Bush Administration's Policy Toward Taiwan (2001 ~ 2004)

The purpose of this paper is to find out the characteristics of the American policy toward Taiwan under George W. Bush's first term of office on the basis of analysis of the policy evolution track with a strong belief that the findings may be of great reference to China's policymaking involved in Sino-U.S. relations and Taiwan issue. There are two dimensions around which analyses are made. One is the "U" turn track in the policy shift. Bush turned his preference of pro-Taiwanese inclination at the earlier months of his office to a reasonable restoration of traditional policy framework. The other dimension is the totally new political situation in Taiwan's political spectrum and its implications for the triangular structural relationship between the U.S., the Mainland and Taiwan. That is that with the rise of "independence forces" to power and their unilateral provocation, the U.S. has been under unprecedented challenges and pressures to contain Taiwan independence. Though Clinton Administration began to suffer the problem, Bush is the first president to systematically cope with these difficulties. With the framing of these two dimensions, Bush Administration's Taiwan policy largely followed the continuity of previous policies of his predecessors and to some extent showed his own features. There are several aspects to mention in terms of continuity. The first that remained is that the U.S.-Taiwan relationship was always secondary to the Sino-U.S. relationship. The second is the inherent contradiction of the policy. The third is the strategic ambiguity being retained to strengthen the double clarity to keep the status quo of cross-strait relationship so as to serve the strategic aim of "neither unification nor independence". The fourth is that the U.S. has been sticking to a balancer role between cross-strait relations with a strong aim of keeping the status quo. In one word the inherent inconsistency of America's Taiwan policy is to serve the maximum flexibility and strategic interest of the U.S. These continuities strongly defined Bush's Taiwan policy and there was little for Bush to do to neglect the continuity framework. The major technical adjustment of policy mainly came from the challenges brought by the unilateral provocation of Taiwan leaders. The strategic aim and policy framework of America's Taiwan policy was being tested and faced with the risk of showing down. Under such circumstances, the top priority of the Taiwan policy had to be stabilizing and maintaining the peace and status quo. Bush's policy has made technical shift that may be regarded as his own features. The first is that the strategic ambiguity was further technically clarified. A so-called "double clarity" was introduced to deter both sides of Taiwan Strait using the policy statement of "opposing any unilateral change of status quo of either side ". But the essence of the strategic ambiguity was still remained regardless of the technical shift. The second is that the U.S. was facing with unprecedented challenges and pressures to deter Taiwan independence. The third is that due to the situational changes and America's festinate style of crisis management of Taiwan's unilateral provocation the peace has been absolutized and the core of the "One China" policy has been further hollowed. Based on the review and analysis of Bush's Taiwan policy there are also several implications that we can find to be of great reference to China's handling of Sino-US relations and cross-strait relations. We must be aware of that the ultimate solving of Taiwan issue has to be a long and difficult process. We must consolidate the strategic mutual benefit base between China and America. We must be fully aware of that Taiwan issue is ultimately an issue of Chinese of both sides of the Strait. We know that keeping and exerting moderate pressure on America about Taiwan issue is an effective means. We now know that Taiwan is not only a passive actor in the triangular structure it could be very active and provocative so that the US may lose c...