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Government Procurement In The Rent-seeking Countermeasures Research

Posted on:2008-07-17Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:X GuFull Text:PDF
GTID:2206360215973137Subject:Constitution and Administrative Law
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Since the 20th century, the theory of rent-seeking has been an popular topic in westem economics. In the domain of government procurement, rent-seeking means the behavior of officials in charge of procurement asking the suppliers for bribe, or of the suppliers bribing the officials, and the two behaviors often mixed each other and interact. Now our country is in a period of transformation of system, which supplies the rent-seeking with more space, especially in fields that the government intervenes in much, such as the government procurement. Rent-seeking in the government procurement caused the waste of social resource, restrained fair competence, obstructed the innovation of system, and fostered the corruption of government. What is worse, it caused the great waste of buying capital of taxpayers. As a result, taxpayers and the society have to bear the whole cost of rent-seeking. Government procurement is an important way of reinforcing the country's management of financial expenditure, of improving the country's capability of macroeconomic control, of impelling and realizing the market of the government's consuming behavior. Therefore, it is very meaningful both in theory and practice to analyze the problem of rent-seeking in government procurement, to discuss how to supervise, control and prevent rent-seeking.This article consists of four parts. PartⅠintroduces rent-seeking in government procurement and analyzes the probability and condition of engendering it, and explains the relationship between government procurement and rent-seeking. PartⅡ, from the perspective of game theory, shows the inevitability of rent-seeking in government procurement under the present system by analyzing the interests of subjects in procurement when rent-seeking occurs or not. PartⅢintroduces the foreign governments' experience and concludes what we can learn from them, and then puts forward the effective measures in preventing rent-seeking. PartⅣexpatiates five concrete measures in order to provide some constructive suggestions and help in preventing rent-seeking.
Keywords/Search Tags:government procurement, rent-seeking, the maximization of interests
PDF Full Text Request
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