Research, Supervision And Decision-making Based On The Outsourcing Of Logistics Service Quality

The Principal-Agent problem in logistics outsourcing has being gradually a hot issue. Meeting such a tendency, the paper researches the monitoring decision of logistics service quality(LSQ) in logistics outsourcing process.Firstly, on the basis of reviewing the existing literature, the paper sums up the LSQ factors in logistics outsourcing process, points out the important role of LSQ, and analyses the risks of logistics outsourcing, monitoring cost and measures of LSQ in logistics process. And because of the existing of asymmetric information, the monitoring of LSQ in logistics process is a Principal-Agent problem.Additionally, from the perspective of quality cost theory, the paper establishes the Principal-Agent model based on monitoring and prevention level of LSQ, and gets the solution under asymmetric information by using Optimal Control theory. The result of the study shows that the logistics buyer does not always increase monitoring level of LSQ under special contract scheme, though it can not observe the TPL ' s prevention of LSQ. The fact is that logistics buyer would take a proper choice by comparing the penalty of internal failures and external failures; The TPL ' s total cost of LSQ under asymmetric information is not smaller than it is under symmetric information, it is the result after logistics buyer takes the monitoring and penalty measures; the more the logistics buyer gives benefit to TPL, the smaller the logistics buyer gets the profit, it is what the logistics buyer have to pay to prompt TPL.