The Research Of Contract Incentive Mechanism About Third Party Logistics

Third party logistics as one of the most advantageous business forms to economic development have been paid extensive attentions. But the principal-agent problems because of the external contract would result in the inefficient third party logistics.in order to ensure effective realization of the logistics outsourcing goals, it’s need some kind of reasonable incentives of contract to prevent relative contract principal-agent problems.so further studying about the incentive mechanism of contract has an important practical significance to development of the third party logistics.After the analysis of principal-agent problems in the third party logistics and relative present researches, this article with the help of the principal-agent theory、incentive theory and mechanism design theory, used the method of mathematical modeling to explore the incentive mechanism in the contract of third party logistics, which can ensure that third party logistics enterprises be able to choose the helpful behaviors to enterprises which demand logistics.In this article, firstly considering adverse selection and moral hazard, on the condition that the ability level and the action level of the third party logistics enterprise cannot be observed, I constructed a contract incentive model about the cooperation of third party logistics, and then discuss the general cooperation contract incentive mechanisms which can help to choose the appropriate third party logistics enterprise and inspire it to hard work. On this basis, respectively aiming at the multi-period cooperation and multitasking features of the third party logistics, I constructed two contract incentive models under the conditions of the corresponding characteristics:in the contract incentive for multi-period, on the basis of incentive about output sharing, I added the rewards and punishment method by dynamically comparing realistic output to the anticipant output; In the aspect of multitasking contract incentive, it’s need to think about the different characteristics of different tasks and the relationship between their costs, and select reasonable incentive factors to different tasks of, in order to encourage the third party logistics enterprise to coordinately expand different efforts on different tasks.At last, the article concluded the series research conclusions about the contract incentive mechanism, and gave some suggestions on contract incentive which can avoid the relative agency problems in the third party logistics.