China's Agricultural Insurance Development Bottleneck

Our country as a traditional agricultural country, but agricultural ability to resist risk is very fragile. In actively constructing socialist harmonious society and realizing common prosperity today, if agriculture don't develop, rural is not stable, farmers'income is not increasing, so the construction of socialist harmonious society and realizing common prosperity will be an empty slogan.The insurance industry develops fast, but the development of agricultural insurance is slow. The development of agricultural insurance is slow by various reasons, first from the huge risk facing agriculture itself, including natural risk and market risk, etc.; second, agricultural insurance confronted by information asymmetry adverse selection and moral hazard problem. This article will use the insurance study, economics, and so the knowledge of the respect, to the agricultural insurance of adverse selection and moral hazard were analyzed, and puts forward relevant strategies to solve the slow development of agricultural insurance, so as to achieve the transfer of rural risk, improving the environment and increasing the farmers' income purpose, in order to construct a socialist harmonious society and realizing common prosperity provide strong power.First, the domestic research situation and trendsIn the agricultural insurance of adverse selection and moral hazard on, Chinese scholars Qiguiyi in "the guard against the risk of adverse selection and moral countermeasures", proposes that risk evaluation mechanism point of view. Yuyaguai in "the effective demand, moral risk:the industrialization of agriculture and the policy-based agriculture insurance."in the article puts forward the concept of the industrialized operation of agriculture. Lvxiuping (2006) from the insurance contract subject to analyze the information asymmetry of the insurance market risk; from the insured and the insurer in the information quality of position respectively situation, analyzes the insurance contract subject information asymmetry risk, the purpose to analyze insurance contract subject information asymmetry of risk prevention countermeasures. Second, research abroad and trendsGeorge Akerlof (George Akerlof,1970) on the old car market model (lemons model) analysis started adverse selection theory precedent. In the old car market, adverse selection problem from buyers and sellers about the quality of the cars information asymmetry. Know the true quality whose car, and buyers don't know, just know car average quality, and therefore only willing to pay the price according to the average quality. This way, the quality is higher than the average level of the sellers will get out of the trade, low quality of the sellers to enter the market, the result is sold on the market of the old car quality drop, buyers willing to pay the price drops further, more higher quality car to withdraw from the market. In a balanced cases, only low quality car clinch a deal. In extreme cases, the market may not exist, trade pareto improvement can't come true. In 1986, Luz Maria Bassoco to Mexico to agricultural insurance subsidies, think the government's premium subsidies less than two-thirds, can effective attract agricultural producers. In 1997, the Knight and Coble agricultural insurance to the United States on the investigation, and discusses the information asymmetry and cause adverse selection and moral hazard.The innovation of this paper place:according to agricultural insurance of adverse selection and moral hazard problem, and puts forward to building the best rewards and punishment system; separately from the government, insurance companies and households taken into account, comprehensive, and puts forward practical measures. In addition, puts forward the developing agricultural enterprise, etc., to the agricultural industry scale management ideas, in order to decrease the risk of adverse selection and moral purpose.This deficiency:the agricultural insurance is not main insurance company's main business, so get the data way less, quantitative analysis is in;in addition, in reference to the literature, obtained by the article limited, in the certain extent impact study.Based on my personal choice, and grasp the thesis topic of insurance knowledge and reading books related articles, this paper roughly divided into six parts:The first part is the introduction section, this paper expounds the problem put forward to choose a background, and the purpose of the research and meaning; domestic and foreign literature review, research methods, the structure arrangement.The second part to the concept of agricultural insurance as the starting point, and gradually stated the agricultural insurance and agricultural risks related problems.The third part focuses on analyzing the development of agricultural insurance encountered in the process of the bottleneck problem-adverse selection and moral hazard problem. The development of agricultural insurance is slow, reason lies mainly in the following two aspects:one is the characteristics of agricultural insurance, high risk, high through the characteristics of high rate, losses. On the other hand is adverse selection and moral hazard problem, while the latter is the focus of analysis in this paper.The fourth part, mainly introduced in adverse selection and moral hazard problem, the present situation of China's agricultural insurance, experience of six stages.The fifth part compared the foreign agricultural insurance in the treatment of adverse selection and moral hazard problem differences, the paper focuses on the United States, Japan, France, and the Philippines agricultural insurance system, and to sum up the foreign agricultural insurance in the lessons.The sixth part as a part of the conclusion of this paper respectively from the government, farmers and agriculture insurance company angle, and puts forward some solutions to the agricultural insurance adverse selection and moral hazard problem of thought.