| Because of the separation of company ownership and the right of management, it causes the contradictions between the agent and the owner. From 1980 to 1990, Jensen and Mecklin put forward the agency cost theory of and stock right structure's incentive functions, American investors gradually accepted the concept of long-term incentives, the public company started to introduction employee stock option plans (ESOPs) by the developed capital market. Because our chairman, directors are also the company's general managers, this kind of phenomenon has always been there, but not as a means of incentive that widely used in the company.Until December 2005 securities regulatory commission issued "stock ownership incentive measures of listed company ", our listed companies began to introduce ESOPs, more and more listed companies appeared ESOPs and research about the relationship between ESOPs and company performance management equity holdings in China's phenomenon, executive performance get more and more attention.According to the profit converging hypothesis, self-defending hypothesis and the actual condition in China, this thesis put forward the hypothesis. With 2008 to 2010 listed companies in China as the research sample, this thesis research the different kind of relationship between employee stock option plans (ESOPs) and company performance. This thesis used the principal component analysis to get firms' comprehensive performance score, executives shareholding share as independent variable, and selected control variables from financial characteristics, equity characteristics, management features and competitive feature aspects, so as to make the result more accurate.The research results show that there is no interval effect between ESOPs and company performance; When the executive shareholding ratio more than 0.15%, there is significantly positive correlation, if reduce the ratio, significant positive correlation disappears; The more the first big shareholder holds, the smaller correlation between ESOPs and company performance, we may not achieve ideal incentive effect by increasing managers'stockholding level, and in the largest and the smallest companies, the prior two variables impacting the company's performance are executives salaries and institution equity percentage and then executives shareholding ratio. Our findings also finds that there are significant positive correlations between institution equity percentage, executive pay and the company performance in three years, and significant negative correlation between debt-to-assets ratio and company performance.This thesis argues that we can pass the corresponding measures to improve the relationship between company performance and executives shareholding share. We can adopt measures as follows:According to the character to determine the necessity of ESOPs and best share; To establish an effective internal and external performance evaluation system, so as to form the inevitable connection between the company performance and managers' efforts, it can't rely on solely financial index or share price as the measure standards of performance; To improve the level of management and perfect the supervision and balance mechanism. We can perfect supervision and balance mechanism from the company management structure, to differentiate clearly the power, responsibility and interests among shareholders, board of directors and managers. We also need to pay attention to the construction and improvement of the internal audit; Perfect Manager market. Through the establishment of the manager market, talented managers and company can be in organic choice; Perfect capital market, reasonable constraint managers' stock market behaviors. In our capital market, we can improve executives shares' liquidity through the strict control of the trading behaviors,allow on-the-job managers do the normal trading, improve the managers' enthusiasm, this will also help to the improve the executives shares. |
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