| Basin ecological compensation is an application of ecological compensation,which is based on profit and loss compensation within the watershed ecosystem caused by externality and its nature of inter-regional public goods.With the government patterns showing more malpractices,research on marketization and the role of the government of ecological compensation mode becomes very important.Therefore,this article addresses two issues targeting basin ecological compensation.How to marketize ecological compensation?What is the role of the government?Taking the watershed downstream relevant stakeholders and government as the study object,the thesis finds the key to marketize watershed ecological compensation and the role the government should act by theoretical analysis.Based on the theories of public goods and externalities,with reference to the ecological compensation theory and practical experiences in China and other countries,the thesis divides the river basin ecological compensation mode into two categories:the government-paying-compensation mode and the user-paying-compensation mode(which is marketized mode).It summarizes five basic principles and analyzes current ecological compensation modes,demonstrating the necessity of marketizing basin ecological compensation.Taking the interests of the basin downstream as the core,it establishes evolutionary game model to analyze the choice of parties of their strategic selections with profit-maximization as the goal and determine the role of the government.Research results are as follows.First,according to the five basic principles of ecological compensation of basin,which is compensating protectors,compensation by beneficiaries,fairness,operational principle,the principle of flexibility,the government-paying mode has great drawbacks,violating several principles the protectors and having negative externalities.The government-paying mode cannot fulfill the goal of basin ecological benefit maximization,which requires marketization.The practice of China’s basin ecological compensation marketization shows the key problem is that the property rights are not clear.Therefore,this thesis presents three water rights system reform of water rights system.The central government decentralizes the management of water resources to the provinces along with the trading rights.The provincial government decentralizes it to cities and counties.Local governments could auction the right to private companies.Thus we have formed basin water resources right system with three layers of decentralization.The question of "How to marketize ecological compensation?" is solved based on the theory of externalities and cost-benefit analysis.Second,assuming that the parties in the upstream and downstream are not rational economic man,the thesis employs evolutionary game model to analyze why the upstream and downstream parties cannot reach optimal ecological strategy in the process of ecological compensation marketization.Therefore,there is a need to establish two feedback punishment system and derive higher levels of government regulatory role from the quantitative point of view.The three main aspects of the game whichaffect feedback gain function are the cost of the complaint,the complaint feedback gains,the main watershed upstream of use,enabling stakeholders on downstream earnings influence function.At the same time the upstream and downstream earnings function parameter analysis shows that factor derived impact on downstream river basinare different.Higher levels of government regulation of the downstream should reflect this difference.Jacobi matrix is a tool to analyze the stability of higher levels government’s effective supervision of game strategy,derived from the model."what role government should serve" is explained at this point.Through theoretical analysis,model analysis,"how to promote ecological compensation to the marketization" and "what role the government should serve"two issues,policy implications is researched.The results were as follows:Market basin ecological compensation crux of Water Resources property rights system is not clear.The legal property of decentralized water resourcesshould be improved.The establishment of three water rights system should be built up to ensure that intra-regional intergovernmental basin water resources-related transactions,cross-regional inter-governmental basin water related transactions,private sector transactions resource-related market transactions of law.Results from the equilibrium and stability of evolutionary game analysis shows that maximize the return game inspired by the formation of ecological parties are unable to customize the optimal strategy,thus establishing two government feedback system of penalties is a necessary condition to achieve the optimal solution watershed ecology.Higher levels of government should play an active role in watershed regulation by regulating power feedback complaint costs,complaint feedback gains,the amount of compensation agreements impact,resulting in a positive impact on the game’s main revenue function.At the same time,upstream and downstream regulatory policy should be acted differently.Governments should also establish an assessment complaints feedback system to ensure standardization of processes. |
