"The9·30Movement"and Johnson Administration’s Policy Of Indonesia(1965-1968)

After the end of World War II, the third world countries set off national independence binge, Indonesia was also in the times and the international environment eventually in1949achieved national independence. Indonesia, which has been suffering from Netherlands colonial humiliation, the country’s government in this period impose nationalism very sensitive in their foreign policy, and it caused the Indonesian Government wants to retain its national independent foreign policy of the implementation of "the neutrality policy ". Since the end of World War II, espe中央情报局lly after Indonesia independence in1949, The United States policy of Indonesia has been the lack of a stable foundation. The reason is that:how to determine the nature of the Sukarno regime and thus develop The United States plagued policy of Indonesia is always a challenge for policymakers. After the1960’s, highly tense situation in South-East Asia region and Sukarno’s radical nationalistic policy also constitutes a test of the politics and decision making ability of Johnson Government. The United States intended to judge the nature of the Sukarno regime, and it was the mainly reason that Johnson Government change its policy towards Indonesia during this period. The papers focus on the content is around "The9·30movement" before and after Indonesia domestic situation changes, and discuss Indonesia foreign policy of United States policy toward Indonesia and details on how to change process focus decision,which in the context of East-West game in camps in Southeast Asia. In addition, the papers further research the Indonesian policy of the Johnson administration’s effectiveness. And it would like to be able to make on the basis of whether or not the Johnson administration on Indonesia’s policy is to achieve the expected conclusions of the policy itself. This paper is divided into four parts.The first part is mainly on The United States administrations on Indonesia’s policy before "The9-30movement". This part is mainly as background to introduction, it as much as possible to make a reasonable explanation for the reaction and making measures of the Johnson administration in the face of Indonesia’s "The9·30movement"The second part is mainly look into the early response of the Johnson administration in the face of this unexpected event. Before the Johnson administration not clear mastering the ins and outs of this event, it can only be cautious and concerned attitude. Especially before the Johnson administration did not have engaged in the motivation of coup and the real dynamic of Indonesian parties, The United States Government does not and cannot make any further response.The third part is written in the Indonesian situation gradually clear, the Indonesian army began to show its advantages, Sukarno and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) gone down the start of case. In case of that, the Johnson administration had begun to change its cautious approach, and thus turned to limited intervention, it also begun to provide a secret aid to Indonesia army, and the secret aid is a important factor for Indonesia army seized the Indonesian regime. And the United States Government, especially what the Johnson administration is playing a role in Indonesia "The9·30movement". No matter before or after the incident, The United States Government has been working with the Indonesian army to maintain a certain degree of contact, but also to a considerable extent on the support, so, Indonesia army who can seize the Indonesia’s power after "The9-30movement", the Johnson administration assistance is a very important factor.Part IV is in the study of what’s the factors affect Johnson Administration’s policy toward Indonesia after "The9-30movement". Both the Johnson administration initially cautious reaction and the late involvement in secret of the Indonesia incident, they all had many complex causes. Chief among them is because the situation in Southeast Asia at that time, especially the opposition between Indonesia and United Kingdom, Malaysia’s, and Johnson eager to have a result in the Viet Nam war in short time, which led to United States Government lack of energy and room for dealing with Indonesia incident. Secondly because, after all, there are differences between the two countries, Indonesia army, who have more common interests with the United States Government, even none of the Indonesian army and the Johnson administration’s policy requires full agreement, let alone the Sukarno Government, the one who pursue nationalist as their high ideals and principles. With these factors, which led to the Johnson Administration’s intervention and impact on the situation in Indonesia was in limited.