Domino Belief And America’s Outside Interference During The Cold War

The domino theory has directed all the presidents of the United States in foreign-policy making process during the Cold War. It has been the cornerstone of American global containment strategy. The domino theory argues that a defeat or retreat on one issue or in one area of the world is likely to produce further demands on the state by its adversaries and defections from its allies, thus a positive feedback effect is formed and will be detrimental to the state’s vital interest. America’s two major wars in the cold war have been fought under the banner of the domino theory, as well as various kinds of interference in the Third World. As a consequence, Soviet-American rivalry in the periphery areas was fueled. While in fact, the theory’s internal structure and logic basis can’t get through careful examination both historically and theoretically. The horrible domino effect that decision makers had feared never come true. Some notions, such as reputational value, bandwagon effect, and closely interconnection between vital value and periphery value, that the domino theory contains exist theoretical defects and flaws. Directly applying these notions to guide practice will instead be misleading. However, in the Cold War this irrational domino theory has been accepted by America’s decision makers without any examination, and constantly played an important role in diplomacy field.To comprehend such phenomenon, an analysis of America’s unique political institution and culture as well as the special environment in the cold war should be conducted. The object of this article is the domino theory acted as America’s strategic concept during the cold war. Combining theoretical analysis and empirical research, macro generalization and case study as research method, based on historical facts, and drawing on achievements of scholars both at home and abroad, this article makes an analysis of the domino belief’s connotation, validity and its causes. There’re four parts in the article. The first part is a brief introduction of the content of domino belief, including its internal structure, logic basis as well as domino mechanisms and conditions under which domino effects are most likely. The second part is case study. Selecting two classic cases of U.S. interference in periphery areas during the cold war, one is the Vietnam War that happened in Asia, the other is America’s interference in Nicaragua in Latin America, this part gives a briefly review of interference decisions made by U.S. policymakers under the influence of the domino belief by carding the history data. On the basis of a deep examination of the two cases, the following part analyzes the reasons why domino effects didn’t happen, then makes a deep analysis of domino belief’s internal structure and logic basis by combining with existing theoretical achievements. And the final part explores the particularity of domino belief in America and tries to find out the causes by reviewing the special background of the Cold War and U.S. unique political institution.