Hold-up Problem Of Humen Capital And Study On The Sponsor System Of Securities Issuance

In2004, the securities issuance sponsor system is implemented in the issuance ofsecurities market, that is, by a securities company (investment bank) as the sponsorand sponsor representative recommend suitable enterprise public issuance ofsecurities and listed on the stock exchange. The design of the system intended toimprove the quality of listed companies to reduce investor risk, protect investors’interests. But for eight years, the implementation of sponsor system does not meetexpectations, there has been a lot of sponsor representatives to pursue their owninterests and take illegal operations,and lead to the interests and reputation loss forsponsor institution.Moreover,the interests of investors is unprotected.Accompanied bythe rapid development of China’s issuance of securities market,China’s securitiesissuance sponsor system requires continuous reform and improvement, sponsor andsponsor representatives also need to role relocate and clarify the growth path anddirection.Based on this, combined with the actual situation in the development process ofChina’s investment banking, we study the sponsors system performanceof ourinvestment banking. This article firstly study of the sponsor (investment banking) andthe sponsor representative nature and causes of hold-up problem of human capitalbased on the introduced the background and effect of Sponsor system.And thenproposed to solve the hold-up problem governance: the mode of cooperation way (act)can not be contracted in advance but can partly be contracted afterwards, so bothparties will be faced with a dispute cost and hold-up cost over the trade-off, and onlythrough reasonable configure the internal control of sponsor can reduce transactioncosts (cost of dispute and hold-up). In view of this findings, this paper then throughcomparison of static analysis to study cash flow claim of different control type of thesponsor (sponsor representative control, the sponsor of the shareholder control andsponsor representative and the sponsor state dependent control),hope to explore thebest organization form of investment Banks. Finally, we select the years of2008-2010of the sponsor related index data, and by using the latest international nonparametricperformance evaluation method (DEA), empirically study the sponsor of theperformance. By measuring the sponsor of various types of the DEA efficiency value, and make a comparative analysis.The conclusion is: the sponsor system exists the hold-up problem of human capitalbetween sponsor and sponsor representatives, the basic reason is that the sponsorinternal control is not reasonable configured, lead to sponsor system (contract) isunable to reach the efficiency of the ante investment and ex post decision-makingefficient equilibrium.The sponsor of the internal control over the rational allocationshould serve to reduce transaction costs (disputed costs and hold-up costs),because therole of human capital corresponding to the specific asset to the buyer (the sponsor)and seller (sponsor representativespeople) only in the rational allocation on the basisof prior property rights to get higher value.In the three types of cash flow undercontrol allocation of residual comparatively static analysis, only state dependentcontrol of the sponsor is optimal (relative performance). The sponsor needs throughsimilar partnership organization form or business model of reform to improve ourcountry securities issue market efficiency.