Study On The Quality Control Of The Stakeholders In The Public Rental Construction In Chongqing

Chongqing public rental compared to ordinary commodity housing, due to itsconstruction schedule advanced a series of problems led to public rental housing hasmany quality problems should cause our enough attention, as a livelihood project,public housing more deserves our attention. Public rental housing quality problems maybe simple analysis of design, construction, technical problems, it is hidden behind theuneven distribution of benefits problems. Stakeholder interactions on project qualityhave great impact, leading to stakeholders in project construction process through thegame to achieve its profit maximization. Therefore, this article from the perspective ofstakeholders, the use of game theory to the Chongqing public rental housingconstruction quality problems in analysis.This article first elaborated the Chongqing public housing background and theChongqing public rental is different from other local affordable housing characteristics,and select typical national public rental housing construction in the process of qualitycontrol in detail, summed up the Chongqing public rental housing construction qualitycontrol recommendations. Next to the Chongqing public rental housing constructionstakeholder identification and analysis, and the impact of the Chongqing public rentalhousing quality factor are analyzed in detail and the main interests of the three party isdefined as: the owner, contractor and supervisor, on the basis of analysis of theconstruction of public rental owner in the process, construction units and supervisionparty three party behavior interaction on the quality of public housing.The core part of construction owner, construction units, supervision of the threeside game model and obtains the game model balanced solution, followed by theconclusion of the analysis of game theory. According to the owner and the constructionunit, owner and supervision, construction units and supervision of three forms of thegame between the constructs of interest game model between different interest subjects,determine the interest equilibrium. The owner, the construction unit, inspect manageparty game in a mixed strategy equilibrium depends on the Nash game process proceeds,namely income decide owners choose the public rental housing project supervision andsupervision, construction units to rent or rent seeking and the supervision of the publicrental housing project selection of rent or rent.Finally, the stakeholders of the result of the game analysis and put forward the effective method of quality control: strengthening public housing project qualityguarantee system and process control, strengthen the construction of factor ofproduction quality control, the public rental housing construction process control andprotection products, from information construction, contract law, economy andpunishment system of public rental housing for effective quality control. Through theimplementation of effective quality control methods, and then adjusting the stakeholdersof the revenue, so that each interest related side to win, thereby effectively improvingthe public housing project construction quality.